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1
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2
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- The law as it currently exists
- The problem: all guerrilla movements may be illegal
- A better formulation of the law
- Law should match reality
- Problems with the new formulation
can be managed
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3
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- Jus ad Bellum– “Just War”
- The motivations for entering a conflict are considered ‘just’ by the
international community
- Jus in Bello– “Just Means”
- The methods used in a war – the tactics, strategies, etc. are
considered ‘just’ by the international community
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4
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- With the formation of the ICTY and specifically the Tadic decision Jus
in Bello can be applied to put an individual in jail
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5
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- 1. Duty to discriminate
- Justifiable targets
- Combatants vs. Non-Combatants
- 2. Duty of Proportionality
- Means employed must be proportional to the objective.
- Killing a fly with a hand grenade
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6
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- During an armed conflict individuals can be broken into three categories
represented below.
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7
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- Currently a justifiable target is governed by Common Article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Convention and 1977 Protocol II
- Restricts justified targets in an internal armed conflict to
individuals taking an active part in the conflict
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8
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- Means employed be a guerrilla must be proportional to the objective.
- Example
- An insurgent may launch a
coordinated attack on the military barracks.
- The insurgent may not drive a truck of explosives into the station
and blow up the block
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9
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10
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- Duty to Discriminate
- Armed Combatants are not the only legitimate threat to an insurgency,
- The relative strength of a regime compared to a guerrilla force can
make regime informants and collaborators as deadly as armed combatants
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11
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12
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13
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- Measure as empirically as possible
- Neutral organizations such as Amnesty International produce such
reports
- Average reports from half a dozen organizations
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14
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- During an armed conflict individuals can be broken into three categories
represented below.
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15
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- Restrict justifiable targets to Group A?
- Problematic because often a collaborator or informant can be as
dangerous as a soldier.
- Individuals can fluidly move between rings
- X might be a combatant one minute, lay down his rifle and become a
civilian the next, before picking up his rifle again.
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16
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- Problematic because the threat from Group B will vary depending on
brutality of regime and alternative available means of dissent
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17
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18
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- What the Iraq Insurgency looks like
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19
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- What would be a justifiable pattern of violence for Iraq Insurgency
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20
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21
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- Under this rubric, events such as Abu Graib and Guantanimo Bay should be
taken very seriously as they could be used to justify a broader sphere
of violence against the United States
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22
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- Theoretically, this rubric could be used to justify an event like 9/11
if it had happened in different country with an astronomical Brutality
Index
- In a situation where a regime’s brutality index was inconceivably high
and all other channels of dissent (this would have to extend very far
such as appearing in public) were closed.
- This scenario would be extremely unlikely; however, it is possible.
- Consider Nazi Germany – Under this theory, it could be justifiable if a
German Jew flew a plane into a Nazi building.
- He/she would point out the regime’s systematic murder of approximately
6,000,000 civilian Jews and the utter lack of any means of opposing
the State’s policy.
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23
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- Insurgency is less likely to occur in societies with open channels for
expressing dissent and organizing opposition to a regime.
- Instead, other less risky means of effecting change will be employed
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24
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- Conversely, as regime
violence towards dissidents increases, the likelihood of an armed
insurgency increases.
- - If individuals know that they will be arrested for passing out pamphlets, they will pursue their goals via other means. Why not pass out Kalishnikovs?
- Linking justifiable
guerrilla violence with regime brutality provides an incentive for the
regime to deal with opposition responsibly and humanely.
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25
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26
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- What if alternative means of expressing dissent are blocked by a private
party?
- 2004 pre-election America several accusations against media
conglomerates that refused to air specific programs criticizing the
government about to seek reelection
- Should that justify violence towards a private party? The Government? How to tell what role and to what
degree the government is responsible?
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27
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- Similarly, what if brutality is carried out privately? Or through subtle government
non-action?
- Violence towards African-Americans in Southern U.S.
- Governmental blacklist which costs an individual his job
- How is this measured?
- Should this be part of the calculus?
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28
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- If there is a flexible line, how is that judged immediately and not
retroactively?
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29
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- Hold the government accountable for
inaction where private suffocation of media outlets or private
violence towards a specific group is apparent.
- Build this into the brutality index in a responsible way.
- Would encourage the government to control violent private groups and
allow for a more transparent media
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30
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- In any system, drawing a useful line between justifiable and illegal
targets difficult.
- This approach offers a more realistic reflection of justifiable targets
because it factors in the varying threat similar targets pose to an
insurgency and the varying degree of risk insurgents face against
different governments.
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31
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- If the line is not realistically drawn and the insurgent cannot
accomplish his/her objective without violating international law, then
the deterrent effect of the law is moot.
- Creating laws that better reflect the reality of an insurgent’s position
can help ensure that the laws are followed.
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