Oblast na ureduvawe

^len 1

(1) So ovoj zakon se ureduvaat uslovite za osnovawe investicioni fondovi i dru{tva za upravuvawe so investicioni fondovi i na~inot na nivnoto rabotewe.

(2) Investicionen fond mo`e da se osnova vo forma na otvoren fond ili vo forma na zatvoren fond.

(3) So investicioniot fond upravuva dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi (vo natamo{niot tekst: dru{tvo), vo soglasnost so statutot na fondot i odredbite na ovoj zakon.

(4) Imotot na fondot zadol`itelno se dr`i i se prika`uva odvoeno od imotot na dru{tvoto.

* ad (2) A specific category within the open-ended funds are the so-called "umbrella-funds". Are they allowed under the new Law (See IFO 7)? [SFBC]

* ad (4) seems to be misplaced. The article probably should be placed in Chapter V [CEELI]

* ad (4) Does this also mean that, in case of bankruptcy of the Company, the assets are segregated automatically from the company's assets? (See IFA 16 subs. 1) [SFBC]

Art. 16 Segregation of fund assets

(1) In the event of bankruptcy of the fund management, assets and rights belonging to the investment fund are not included in the bankruptcy estate but are segregated in favour of the investors, subject to the claims of the fund management (Art. 14)

(2) Debts of the fund management which did not arise under the collective investment contract may not be set off against claims of the investment fund.



Dejnost na investicioniot fond

^len 2

(1) Investicioniot fond (vo natamo{niot tekst: fond) se osnova vrz osnova na odobrenie od Komisijata za hartii od vrednost (vo natamo{niot tekst: Komisija) isklu~ivo zaradi javno pribirawe pari~ni sredstva i stvari po pat na javna proda`ba na dokumenti za udel (kaj otvoreniot fond) ili akcii (kaj zatvoreniot fond).

* Article 2 (1) refers to collecting "Assets in kind" from the public. It is unclear what the drafters have in mind because this provision seems to contradict Article 14 (3). As a related matter, Article 30 (2) allows closed-end shares to be paid for by "securities or rights". These provisions and their relationship to each other need to be clarified. [CEELI]

* Da se oceni celishodnosta na terminot: "udel", koj vo Zakonot za trgovski dru{tva e definiran kako sopstveni~ki vlog. Namesto toa se predlaga da se zameni so posoodveten termin: "investicionen sertifikat", "investicionen kupon" ili "investiciona edinica", so ogled deka stanuva zbor za sopstveni~ki vlog. (MB)

* namesto stvari se predlaga zborot predmeti?! (MH)

* Maybe mention should be made of the fact that the fund is a pool of assets managed collectively (by the Company in favour of investors), contrary to individual investments. What "from the public" means, should be defined either in a Satutory Instrument or by the Commission, e. g. in "Practice Statements". [SFBC]

Ovaa zabele{ka zaslu`uva vnimanie: Bi bilo po`elno i korisno nekade da se definira {to pretstavuva Investicioniot fond. Za toa mo`e da poslu`i definicijata na IF dadena vo {vajcarskiot Federal Act on Investment Funds:

Art. 2 Definitions

1. The investment fund is a pool of assets raised from investors as a result of public solicitation for the purpose of collective investment, and managed by the fund management for account of the investors, generally on the principle of risk deversification.

2. Regardless of its form, any solicitation which is targeted at persons other than a narrowly defined group of persons is deemed to be a public solicitation. A company's existing clientele is not automatically regarded as a narrowly defined group of persons. (IFA)

(2) Dokumentite za udel ili akciite od stav 1 na ovoj ~len mo`at da se izdavaat i prodavaat po dobivaweto na odobrenie za osnovawe na fondot.

(3) Pribranite sredstva od stav 1 na ovoj ~len so uva`uvawe na principite na sigurnost, profitabilnost, likvidnost i podelba na rizikot, se vlo`uvaat vo neograni~eno prenoslivi hartii od vrednost i vo pari~ni depoziti.

* Maybe this provision should be somewhat relaxed in order to allow - to a limited extent - investments in less liquid instruments and/or investments with only reduced risk-spreading, by adding a word such as "normally" or "generally". [SFBC]

=> ova za pomalku likvidni instrumenti vo Germanskiot predlog be{e predvidena mo`nost i za investirawe vo nedvi`nosti, no na{iot stav be{e da se orientirame isklu~ivo vo investirawe vo pari i hartii od vrednost. I sega mislam deka treba da ostaneme na na{iot stav.

* Article 2 (3) requires investing on the "principles of prudence, profitablity, liquidity and risk sharing". If this provision is meant to create a standard of investment for all funds, the language may be too restrictive. While standards are often appropriate, this standard seemingly would exclude investments in new enterprises, new techmologies, and business recovering from financial trouble or having a bad year. This standard discourages public investment in enterpreneurship through the mutual fund vehicle. There is no reason why a fund may not invest its assets in start-up or other risky ventures, so long as the investors in the ahres know what they are doing. [CEELI]

=> imaj}i gi predvid negativnite iskustva so makedonskite {tedilnici, odredena doza na zgolemena prudentnost ne e na odmet. Vo sprotivno, dokolku i prvite investicioni fondovi, nabrgu po nivnoto osnovawe po~nat da propa|aat toa bi imalo mnogu lo{i implikacii za sevkupniot finansiski sistem. Vsu{nost, potrebno e da se pronajde vistinskiot optimum me|u fleksibilnosta i sigurnosta na plasmanite.

Statut na fondot

^len 3

(1) Statutot na fondot gi ureduva raboteweto na fondot i pravnite odnosi na dru{tvoto so sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel vo otvoreniot fond, odnosno so akcionerite na zatvoreniot fond.

* I wonder whether all provisions related to the unit-owners should not be grouped under one single Chapter, see e.g. IFA 23-28. It is not clear to me, what the civil-law basis of the legal relationship between the Company and the unit-owner is; in Switzerland we call it a "collective investment contract", see IFA 6. Is there a legal relationship between the unit-owner and the Depo-Bank (see IFA 6 subsection 2)? As, like in Switzerland, the unit-owners do not have the rights of shareholders, it is very important that, apart from protection by the Commission, they have legal remedies to defend their interests against the Company. What individual rights do unit-owners have vis-a-vis the C to be informed (see, e.g. IFA 26)? Are there provisions of the civil-law liability of the Company and the Depo-Bank against investors in case of breach of contract, breaches of the law, etc.? [SFBC]

* Article 3 (1) provides that the Statute of the Fund regulates the legal relations between the management company and the share owners. This is a critical function of the Statute of the Fund, for the relationships are essentially contractual. There are some important aspects to the relationship, such as Article 41 and Article 1, that should be mandated by statutory law anfd not only by contract. Other relationship criteria will be set by the Securities Commission rule, since the SEC will have to apptove the Statute of the Fund. Some provisions relating to approval decisions by the SEC do not indicate any criteria for the SEC to follow. For example, Article 3 does not indicate when it would be appropriate for the SEC to disapprove the Statute of the Fund or a change in it. The SEC criteria should be uniform in application to all funds, or categories of funds, that the SEC may regulate. [CEELI].

=> obete zabele{ki zalsu`uvaat vnimanie.

(2) Komisijata go odobruva statutot na fondot i sekoja negova promena. Komisijata mora da donese odluka za statutot vo rok od 60 dena od negovoto podnesuvawe. Ako Komisijata vo toj rok ne donese odluka vo vrska so baraweto za odobruvawe na statutot, se smeta deka toj e odobren.

* Ako veke se pretpostavuva "mol~eweto na administracijata" toga{ posoodvetno e da se bara soglasnost, a ne odobreni. (MH)

* I wonder whether it is wise to put the Cimmission under time-pressure, especially in the first months, when there still is not much experience with the new Law. At least, the period should not start to run until the Commission has decided that the application file is complete. [SFBC]

* Article 3 (2) provides that the approval of the commission becomes unnecessary after sixty days. The drafters might consider that provision be made for comments by the commission to be followed by amendments by the applicant and ultimate action by the commission. If the commission delays beyond a certain point, the applicant could have the right to bring a suit in court to insist that the commission take action. This right to court review should also be available in the event that the commission refuses to approve the Statute of the Fund or take other action necessary for the fund or its management company to begin or continue. Also, the commission needs some discretion on approval of applications. Sixty days may be too short, and Article 3 (2) should permit an extension for cause. Also, it may be better to specify "within 60 days of its receipt", rather than "within 60 days of its submission" in Article 3 (2), or a rule that requires that a decision is due "within 60 days of acceptance of the application by the Commission", because the commission may "receive" an application that is insomplete or legally invalid." [CEELI]

(3) Statutot na fondot mora da gi sodr`i slednive elementi:

* Is the Statute part of the Contract between the Company and the unit-owners? What is the relationship between the Statute and the Prospectus? Must the Statute also be given to the unit-owners, or is it even a part of the Prospectus? [SFBC]

* Artcile 3 (3) details what information must be included in the Statute of the Fund. Some of the information may change over time or require further definition, and, as such, Article 3's requirements might be better if done pursuant to rules and regulations adopted by the Securities Commission. For example, Article 3 (3.2) and 3 (3.6) are ambiguous provisions and need further definition. Additionally, Article 3 (3.5) addresses selling expenses. Selling expenses will vary considerably over time. The Statute of the Fund will have to be flexible in its terms or revised from time to time. Securities Commission rules should set the guidelines, limits, and manner of calculation for these expenses. Likewise, Article 3 (3.4) needs further regulation because management fees are an area of possible abuse by a management company. There need to be effective controls on excess fees for "management" as well as for "investment advice". Some fund managers may hire outside investment advisors, may have an affiliated advisory company, or may even charge for their own investment advice. These possible abuses can be regulated in the Statute of the Fund, by Securities Commission rule, or by legislation such as Article 40. [CEELI]

1. mo`nosta fondot da steknuva hartii od vrednost,

2. osnovnite principi na vlo`uvaweto na sredstvata,

* I would add: ...."with special emphasis on any particular risk involved in the investment policy" [SFBC]

=> ovaa sugestija izgleda prifatliva.

3. maksimalniot del od fondot koj smee da se dr`i vo vid na depoziti i kolku iznesuva minimalniot del od fondot {to se dr`i vo vid na depoziti,

4. na~inot na presmetkata i isplatata na nadomestokot na tro{ocite na dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondot, na depozitnata banka i na treti lica,

5. visinata za tro{ocite za izdavawe dokumenti za udel, delot od uplatite na sopstvenicite na udeli {to }e se koristi za pokrivawe na tro{ocite i na~inot na presmetuvawe na tie tro{oci,

6. na~inot na vodewe na smetkovodstvoto, izvestuvaweto za razvojot na fondot i negovata struktura, kako i mestoto i na~inot na objavuvawe na tie informacii,

7. na~inot na rasporeduvawe na ~istata dobivka na fondot,

* Definition of "net-earnings" not clear to me; do they include both income and capital gains (rather a tax than a regulatory matter)? Furthemore it should be stated, if distribution of "net earnings is compulsory or whether "accumulation" of net earnings would be an alternative (witholding of earnings in the fund would be attractive to investors!). [SFBC]

=> zaslu`uvaat vnimanie sugestiite

8. mo`nosta za sklu~uvawe opciski i terminski raboti i primena na sli~ni instrumenti i tehniki.

* In addition to the possibility of engaging in derivatives markets, the statute could also include the objective of using this markets (e. g. hedge). [EGRJ] Eduardo Gomes Rio de Janeiro

= > ovaa zabele{ka bi mo`ela da se prifati so toa {to na krajot od to~kata 8. bi se dodale zborovite "i nivnoto koristewe za t.n. obezbeduvawe (hedging).

* maybe IFO-FBC 1-11 might be of interest to you. Details could be dealt with in a statutory instrument. It is always more efficient, if such technical matters can be dealt with and, if necessary, amended by the Regulatory Authority instead of Parliament. [SFBC]

=> ovaa zabele{ka zaslu`uva apsolutno vnimanie i e na linija na ona {to i Endi i SEK i SILI ni go velat site ne{ta {to se podlo`ni na menuvawe i se od tehni~ka priroda da ne se stavaat vo zakonot tuku da se predvidi mo`nost regulativata svrzana so niv da ja donesuva Komisijata!

* I wonder whether the points mentioned in Art. 16 could not be mentioned here as well. [SFBC]

=> da se razmisli mo`ebi e vo pravo.



* The drafters may also wish to consider adding to the list of required elements for the Statute of the Fund. Suggested additions to the list include:


Prospekt na fondot

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(1) Prospektot pretstavuva javna ponuda i povik za kupuvawe dokumenti za udel vo otvoreniot fond i za upis na akcii na zatvoreniot fond. Prospektot mora da sodr`i informacii i podatoci vrz osnova na koi vlo`uva~ite bi mo`ele da dobijat pretstava za realnata sostojba na fondot. Kon prospektot se prilo`uva i statutot na fondot.

* Article 4 (1) suggests that the fund shares are to be issued at one time, like a corporate stock issue. This will not necessarily be the case. The fund may operate for many years, selling and redeeming shares continually during that time. The prospectus is the key disclosure document for new investors and, therefore, must be continually revised to be kept current. This staute should recognize the continuing nature of the prospectus and require updating of the prospectus. The SEC could appropiately make rules about what information must be updated and how often. The financial condition, auditor, management company personnel, depo bank, investment advisors, and expenses, at the very least, should be kept updated. Article 13 may be the appropriate place to require periodic updating of the prospectus.


The updated prospectus and other specified information should be disclosed to every share owner, as well as filed with SEC and published in the Official Gazett and newspaper. Also, the drafters should keep in mind that numerous disclosures often simply confuse investors. This may be a particular problem in Macedonia, where there are many new investors. The drafters may wish to consider whether to require such devices as redlined boxes or bold print to highlight the most important information in the prospectus. Furthermore, it may be difficult for the industry to comply with a vague requirement such as "an accurate representation of the real condition of the fund" in Article 4 (1). More specifity is required.. [CEELI]

* It shoud be stated that the prospectus and any subsequent changes thereof must be filed (not: approved) with the Commission. [SFBC]

=> predlogot e prifatliv

* This article could include a provision determinin a provision that prospectus may not deiffer from the statute. [EGRJ]

=> predlogot e prifatliv

(2) Prospektot mora da gi sodr`i slednite podatoci:

1. nazivot na fondot,

2. datumot na osnovawe na fondot i vremetraewe na fondot, ako toa e ograni~eno,

3. mestoto kade mo`e da se dobijat finansiskite izve{tai,

4. podatoci za dano~nite propisi koi se odnesuvaat na fondot, ako tie se od zna~ewe za sopstvenicite na dokumentite na udeli vo fondot,

5. dinamikata na isplata na u~estvoto vo dobivkata,

6. imeto na ovlasteniot revizor,

7. vidot i glavnite karakteristiki na dokumentite za udel ili na akciite, osobeno:

- pravata koi proizleguvaat od dokumentite za udel ili akciite,

- karakteristiki na dokumentite za udel ili na akciite (nivniot vkupen broj vo optek i brojot na udeli vo eden dokument),

- pravata na sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel ili akcionerite vo slu~aj na likvidacija na fondot,

8. postapkata i uslovite za izdavawe i/ili proda`ba na dokumentite za udelite ili akciite,

9. pravilata za presmetuvawe i za upotreba na prihodite,

10. celite i politikata na vlo`uvawata na fondot i mo`nite ograni~uvawa,

11. pravila za utvrduvawe na vrednosta na imotot na fondot,

12. odreduvawe na cenite na proda`ba i izdavawe dokumenti za udel ili akcii, osobeno:

- na~in i dinamika na presmetuvawe na cenite,

- podatoci za tro{ocite za kupuvawe i izdavawe na dokumentite za udel ili na akciite,

- podatoci za na~inot, mestoto i dinamikata na objavuvawe na cenite i tro{ocite,

13. na~inot na presmetuvawe i iznosot na nadomestocite i tro{ocite za dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovite, depozitnata banka ili treti lica na tovar na imotot na fondot,

14. na~inot i mestoto na isplata na u~estvoto vo dobivkata na sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udeli ili akcionerite,

15. nadvore{nite sovetodavni dru{tva i sovetnici za vlo`uvawe, ako nivnite uslugi se koristat na dogovorna osnova i nadomestocite za nivnite uslugi koi se isplatuvaat od imotot na fondot i toa:

- imeto na dru{tvoto ili sovetnikot,

- detali za dogovorot so dru{tvoto koi se bitni za sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udeli ili akcionerite, pokraj detalite koi se odnesuvaat na nadomestocite,

- drugi va`ni raboti;

16. nazivot, pravnata forma, sedi{teto na dru{tvoto i mestoto na upravata, ako e razli~no od sedi{teto na dru{tvoto,

17. datumot na osnovawe i upis vo sudskiot registar na dru{tvoto i vremetraewe na dru{tvoto, ako toa e ograni~eno,

18. podatoci za drugi fondovi ako dru{tvoto upravuva i so drugi fondovi,

19. imiwata i funkciite na ~lenovite na upravata i nadzorniot odbor, najva`nite funkcii koi tie lica gi vr{at nadvor od dru{tvoto, ako tie se bitni,

20. visinata na osnovniot kapital na dru{tvoto,

21. nazivot, sedi{teto, dejnosta i visinata na osnovniot kapital na depozitnata banka.

* Some information to be described in the prospectus, such as items 9, 11, and 12, are very technical and the majority of investors may not understand this information; therefore, it is sufficient if this information is briefly described in plain language in the prospectus or disclosed in the statute, as including the full information in the prospectus could increase management costs. On the other hand, it could contain information concerning past returns, which is more useful for common investors.


* Article 4 (2) is a list of information that must be provided in the fund's prospectus. The drafters may wish to:

The drafters may wish add some specifics to the Article 4 requirements. Article 4 (2.7) should require:

* Article 4 (2.18) requires that the prospectus contain information about other funds, if the company manages othe rfunds. Drafters may wish to require that the performance data of other funds not be presented in a misleading manner and not obscure or impede understanding of information that is required in the prospectus. Furthermore, the performance of other funds might only be used in a fund prospectus if the fund itself does not have any performance history. The use of other fund's performance data should not be intended as a substitute for the performance data of the fund itself. The prospectus should specify what information is desired about other funds. A SEC rule is an appropriate place to detail what specification is necessary.

In addition, the drafters may wish to require that the prospectus contain the following:

Finansiski izve{tai

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(1) Dru{tvoto izgotvuva posebni polugodi{ni i godi{ni finansiski izve{tai za sekoj fond so koj upravuva.

(2) Godi{niot finansiski izve{taj sodr`i pregled na imotot, ras~leneti smetki za prihodite i rashodite vo tekot na delovnata godina, izve{taj za dejnostite vo izminatata delovna godina i drugi podatoci i informacii koi im ovozmo`uvaat na vlo`uva~ite celosno zapoznavawe so vistinskata sostojba, razvojot na dejnosta i rezultatite na fondot.

(3) Polugodi{niot finansiski izve{taj gi sodr`i podatocite predvideni vo ~len 6 t. 1 do 4 na ovoj zakon, kako i za isplatite na akontaciite na podelbata na dobivkata na fondot, ako tie se izvr{eni ili ako se predvideni. Podatocite moraat da go izrazuvaat finansiskiot rezultat po odbivaweto na site tro{oci i obvrski za konkretnoto polugodie, kako i izvr{enite ili predvidenite isplati na akontacii na podelba na dobivkata.

* In case of "advance payments", which I understand are interim dividends, there is room for caution in order to avoid problems. If you want to allow them at all, if the financial data based upon which such interim payment is made , should have been reviewed and endorsed by an authorized auditor. It is not clear to me wether this is compulsory; under the IFA, half-year figures are not audited. [SBFC]

=> mo`ebi e najdobro voop{to da ne se predviduva mo`nosta za akontativno pla}awe na dobivkata!

(4) Podatocite sodr`ani vo izve{tajot mora da bidat provereni od ovlasten revizor koj gi proveruva finansiskite izve{tai, vklu~uvaj}i go i knigovodstvoto na dru{tvoto. Naodot i misleweto na revizorot za izvr{enata revizija, kako i mo`nite ograni~uvawa na misleweto moraat vo celost da bidat vneseni vo sekoj godi{en finansiski izve{taj.

* Is the "report" mentioned in this subsection only the yearly report? [SFBC]

(5) Dru{tvoto mora da i dostavi na Komisijata godi{ni finansiski izva{tai za site fondovi so koi upravuva, vo rok od tri meseci po istekot na delovnata godina i polugodi{ni finansiski izve{tai, vo rok od dva meseca po istekot na prvoto polugodie od tekovnata godina.

(6) Komisijata mo`e da propi{e i obvrska za izrabotka, dostavuvawe i objavuvawe finansiski izve{tai na fondot i za pokusi vremenski periodi.

* As to the role of the auditors, I found only a few provisions and no regulations about the requirements to be imposed on the authorization of external auditors? If you have the same supervisory system as Switzerland which relies heavily on the external auditors and very rarely on-the-spot examinations by FBC itself, tough requirements should be imposed, see e.g. IFA 52-53 and IFO 79-83. It might also be useful for the Commission to give detailed instructions to the auditors as to the performance of specific checks and investigations against both the Company and the Fund. See the detailed Swiss rules regarding the so-called (annual) "audit report", IFO-FBC 44ss. Does the Commission have the necessary powers? [SFBC]

* Article 5 requires only annual and semi-annual financial reports. In the US, quarterky reports are filed for public companies, and monthly financial reports are available for many purposes. The semi-annual requirement seems much too infrequent for current financial reports. Article 5 (2) appears to require comparative financial reports for two years. Comparative financial reports are a good idea, but their requirements should be specified more clearly in the article. Additionally, the SEC will need to make rules requiring the specific "data and information that enable the investors to get right picture of the situation" in Article 5 (2). The "right picture of the situation" standard is legally vague and needs clarification.

=> apsolutno se vo pravo: ovaa formulacija e ostatok od prethodniot sistem kade ni{to ne se definira{e precizno!


Sodr`ina na finansiskite izve{tai na fondot

^len 6

Finansiskite izve{tai zadol`itelno sodr`at podatoci za:

1. sostojbata na imotot na fondot:

- hartiite od vrednost,

- bankarskite depoziti,

- drugiot imot,

- vkupniot imot,

- obvrskite,

- neto vrednosta na imotot,

2. brojot na dokumentite za udel ili akciite vo optek,

3. vrednosta na poedine~niot udel,

4. strukturata na portfolioto na hartiite od vrednost:

- hartiite od vrednost koi kotiraat na berzata za hartii od vrednost,

- hartiite od vrednost so koi se trguva na nekoj drug reguliran pazar,

- novite emisii na hartii od vrednost,

Za sekoj vid hartii od vrednost se naveduva nivniot udel vo vkupniot imot na fondot i podatoci za promenata vo sostavot na portfolioto na hartii od vrednost za periodot na koj se odnesuva izve{tajot,

5. podatoci za promeni vo prihodite i rashodite na fondot za periodot za koj se odnesuva izve{tajot:

- prihodi od vlo`uvawa,

- drugi prihodi,

- tro{oci za upravuvawe,

- tro{oci za depozitnata banka,

- drugi tro{oci i dava~ki,

- neto-prihod,

- isplati na dobivka na sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel ili na akcionerite, kako i povtorno vlo`enata dobivka,

- drugi promeni koi se odnesuvaat na imotot i obvrskite na fondot.

6. komparativen pregled za raboteweto vo poslednite tri godini, pri {to za krajot od sekoja delovna godina se naveduva:

- vkupnata neto-vrednost na portfolioto,

- neto-vrednosta na poedine~niot udel.


* The financial Reports should be based on generally accepted accounting standards. Are there specific Accounting Rules applicable? If not, the Commission or the Industry could lay down some minimum standard for the accounting format, see e.g. IFO-FBC 26ss. [SFBC]

* Article 6-1: Financial reports should also contain information concerning derivatives. [EGRJ]

* Article 6-6: Comparative tables should also contain past return information; a benchmark comparison should be also useful for investors decision. [EGRJ]

* vo ~len 6, to~ka 4, alinea 2 da se definira zna~eweto na "nekoj drug reguliran" pazar vo smisla dali e toa neoficijalen pazar na Berza ili se raboti za trguvawe "preku {alter". (MB)

* vo ~len 6 vo to~ka 6 da se dopolni so podatoci koi se odnesuvaat na vrednosta na akciite na zatvoreniot fond. Ova e potrebno zatoa {to cenite na akciite na zatvorenite fondovi ne se determinirani samo od neto vrednosta na imotot, odnosno vrednosta na nivnoto portfolio, tuku i od op{tite uslovi na ponudata i pobaruva~kata na Berzata, {to mo`e da dovede cenata na akciite na zatvorenite fondovi dabide pogolema ili pomala od neto vrednosta na imotot na fondot. (MB)

* The information in Article 6 and Article 7 should be subject of rules and regulations of the commission and included in the prospectus. Article 6 (6) requires that a comparative table be included in the report showing fund activity "during the last three years". At some point, the drafters might consider a table that compares performance over a one-, five-, and ten-year period. The table might also include "average total return data". A discussion of the factors that materially affected performance in the most recent completed fiscal years would be an appropriate addition to the financial report. There should also be a reference to "share price" because provision also applies to closed-end funds. [CEELI]

=> site uka`uvawa se prifatlivi!


Dokumenti koi se vra~uvaat pri kupuvaweto dokumenti za udel

ili pri upisot na akcii

^len 7

(1) Pred sklu~uvaweto dogovor za kupuvawe dokumenti za udel ili upis na akcii na mo`niot kupuva~, odnosno zapi{uva~ na akcii mora besplatno da mu se vra~i prospektot, kako i posledniot godi{en i polugodi{en finansiski izve{taj, ako se objaveni.

(2) Godi{niot i polugodi{niot finansiski izve{taj moraat da i bidat dostapni na javnosta na mestata navedeni vo prospektot.

(3) Godi{nite i polugodi{nite finansiski izve{tai im se dostavuvaat besplatno na sopstvenicite na dokumenti za udel ili na akcionerite na nivno barawe.

(4) Vo sekoja objava koja direktno ili indirektno povikuva na kupuvawe dokumenti za udel vo fondot ili za zapi{uvawe na akcii mora da se navede deka postoi prospekt i da se navedat mestata kade {to toj mo`e besplatno da se dobie.

* The drafters may wish to consider deleting "if they are published" from Article 7 (1) and requiring the publication and distribution to share owners and new purchasers of the financial reports. Likewise, it may be better policy to send the reports to owners without request. Open, candid, honest, and public reporting is an important check on abuses, a key to good owner/investor relations, and an aid to financially sound business. [CEELI]

=> sugestiite se prifatlivi!

Imot na fondot

^len 8

(1) Imotot na fondot se sostoi od neograni~ieno prenoslivi hartii od vrednost i pari~ni depoziti.

* ona stvari vo 2 (1) jas bi go bri{el. (VK)

(2) Hartiite od vrednost vo smisla na ovoj zakon glasat na ime i mo`e da kotiraat na berza ili na drug reguliran pazar.

* Vo ~len 8, stav 2 posle zborovite "glasat na ime" da se bri{e tekstot do to~kata i na negovo mesto da se dodade sledniot tekst: "i na donositel i mo`e da kotiraat ili so niv da se trguva na Berza". Od navedeniot stav se podrazbira deka imotot na fondot se sostoi samo od dolgoro~ni hartii od vrednost {to glasat na ime so {to se isklu~eni obvrznicite koi glasat na donositel i kretkoro~nite hartii od vrednost (sertifikati za depozit, blagajni~ki i komercijalni zapisi) koi isto taka glasat na donositel i ne kotiraat na Berzata. (MB)

(3) Imotot od st. 1. i 2. od ovoj ~len mo`e da se steknuva vo soglasnost so odredbite na ovoj zakon i statutot na fondot.

* There are several provisions regarding the acceptable composition of fund portfolios, and sometimes the restrictions differ. For example, Article 2 (3) and Article 8 (1) both require fund assets to be invested in securities and money deposits. Article 6 (4) indicates three types of securities. However, the article mentions nothing about money deposits or foreign securities, nor does the article provide any details about "new issues of securities" Article 8 (2) does not mention new securities or foreign securities. Article 9 (1) seems to be the most comprehensive definition, but the article is unclear about the scope of the reciprocity principle to which it refers. Also, there is no indication of the consequences of a failure of new securities to gain listing on a stock exchange or regulated market. As a technical matter, these duplications and inconsistencies can be avoided by having one provision define eligible securities and having other provisions simply refer to that term.

The provisions dealing with permitted investments would appear to outlaw money market funds. Similarly, restrictions on the percentage of assets that may be held in government bonds would effectively outlaw government bond funds. It might be noted that similar restrictions were applicable in Germany until 1994 when, presumably based on their experience, these restrictions were changed to permit investments of up to one hundred percent of the assets of the fund in monetary assets and to remove a number of limitations on investment in government bonds. particularly in the case of closed-end funds and in light of the apparent interest in stimulating local investment, it may be desirable to make some more specific provision for investment in illiquid securities and for determination of the proper means of valuing such invetsments. [CEELI]


Hartii od vrednost na fondot

^len 9

Hartiite od vrednost na fondot se sostojat isklu~ivo od:

1. hartii od vrednost koi kotiraat na berza ili se prodavaat na drug reguliran pazar vo Republika Makedonija ili vo druga dr`ava vrz principot na reciprocitet.

2. hartiite od vrednost od novite emisii, ako uslovite za nivno izdavawe sodr`at obvrska za podnesuvawe barawe za vklu~uvawe na hartiite od vrednost na nekoja berza ili na nekoj drug reguliran pazar od to~ka 1. od ovoj ~len.

* Vo ~len 9, to~ka 1 po zborovite "kotiraat na Berza" se predlaga da se vnesat zborovite "ili so niv se trguva na Berza". Isto taka, se nametnuva potrebata vo ovaa to~ka da se preispita opredelbata za reciprotitet, od aspekt na pottiknuvawe na razvojot na pazarot na kapital. (MB)

* Article 9 of the Law appears to limit the types of securities a fund may hold in its portfolio to (i) securities quoted on a stock exchange or sold on another regulated market in Macedonia (or another country on the principle of reciprocity) and (ii) newly issued securities, if the issuer is obligated to request admission of the security on a stock exchange or other regulated market. This provision apparently prohibits funds from holding privately offered securities. We note that U. S. funds are not prohibited from holding such securities. (SEC)

* Although the principle of reciprocity can be effective means of opening foreign markets, I wonder, under the aspect of investor protection, at least Stock Exchanges from OECD_Members should be generally recognized. Moreover, in case Macedonia has signed the WTO/CATS-Agreement, it is doubtful whether this general provision can be maintained, as it is not necessary for sepervisory purposes. (SFBC)

* Article 9 suggests two issues. The reciprocity of stock exchange seems to be an unnecessary restriction on the free enterprise that investment fund foster, unless the idea is to ensure that the foreign stock exchanges are responsable organizations. Article 9 (2) states that newly issued securities may be purchased by the funds even though the commission may not ultimately approve the securities for admission on a stock exchange or other regulated market. This raises the problem of non-liquid assets that the fund should not have to face. It is unclear whether there are restrictions on foreign investment in these funds. it is similarly unclear what the effect of the references on reciprocal investment in the context of investment in foreign securities is intended to address. (CEELI)

= > razgledaj gi zable{kite od aspekt na repekusiite vrz mo`niot odliv na doma{en kapital vo stranstvo (finansirawe na stranski firmi).

Ogani~uvawa na vlo`uvawata

^len 10

(1) Vo hartii od vrednost na eden izdava~ ne smee da se vlo`uva pove}e od 5% od vrednosta na imotot na fondot. Po isklu~ok, fondot mo`e da investira do 10 % od vrednosta na svojot imot vo obvrznici na Republika Makedonija.

(2) Fondot mo`e da steknuva najmnogu do 10% od vkupniot broj izdadeni akcii na eden izdava~.

(3) Fondot mo`e da steknuva najmnogu do 10% od vkupniot nominalen iznos na site obvrznici od ist izdava~ koi se vo optek.

(4) Depozitite vo banki i drugi pari~ni sredstva na fondot mo`at da iznesuvaat najmnogu 49% od vrednosta na imotot na fondot.

* Vo ~len 10, stav 1 da se bri{at ograni~uvawata za dr`avnite obvrznici so ogled na faktot deka stanuva zbor za najsiguren instrument za investirawe, taka {to nema potreba da bide ograni~ena visinata na vlo`uvawata na fondot. Iskustvata od drugite dr`avi (Polska, Germanija) uka`uvaat deka ograni~uvawe za dr`avni obvrznici ne postojat.

* Vo ~len 10, to~ka 4 zaradi precizirawe na smislata na tekstot, zborot "drugi" treba da se ~lenuva. Vo istata to~ka da se preispita procentot na vlo`uvawe vo depoziti vo banki, koj se ocenuva kako visok, so ogled na potrebata od prioritetno vlo`uvawe na imotot na fondot vo hartii od vrednost kako osnovna dejnost koja }e obezbedi razvoj na pazarot na kapital vo RM. (MB)

* So ovoj ~len se davaat dva vida na ograni~uvawa, vrednosen i broj~an. Po`elno e precizno da se formulira dali stanuva zbor za kumulativno ili alternativno ograni~uvawe. (MH)

* Severe diversification requirements, such as that a fund must not invest more than 5% of the value of its assets in securities of the same issuer, can lead to redemption problems in markets whose liquidity is concentrated in a few securities; in addition, as managers are "tightened", funds appear to be very similar. Until 1994, Brazilian funds should not invest more than 1/3 of its assets in securities issued by a single corporation. As the main Brazilian stock index (BOVESPA) has one single stock which represents more than 50% of its composition, it was impossible for managers to build a portfolio similar to it, and most interesting, market index has beaten almost all funds. In 1994 a CVM Rule was instituted allowing the creation of "free portfolio" stock mutual funds, which can concentrate the total portfolio into a single asset. As a result, some funds achieved very high return rates (and others very low), in a way that a heavy competition was established. The necessity of concentration to achieve higher returns is in accordance to modern portfolio theory, that not only states that diversification leads to risk diminishing, but also that higher returns implies in incuring more risk. Therefore, even considering that diversification is convinient to small investors, allowing portfolio concentration should not be prohibited, specially when shareholders are exclusively institutional investors or other market professionals. [EGRJ]

* 10-2. Would not it be more precise to say: max. 10% of the voting rights... see IFO 39 (1).

10-4. Are there no risk diversification rules with regard to cash? In "the worst of all cases", no less than 49% of all assets of the Fund could be on deposit with the Depo Bank, which constitutes a credit risk. [SFBC]

* Some limits would improve the safety of the funds, particularly since securities traded on foreign exchanges are permitted. For example, any securities traded on foreign exchanges that do not have strong financial ability requirements for exchange members and participants have a higher degree of risk. Very low priced securities are generally considered to carry a higher risk. Corporate and government bonds have ratings that give some risk assessment. For example, in the United States, certain investors, such as trust fiduciaries and government units, have restrictions that prohibit or limit the amount of "speculative grade" bonds (Standard and Poor's rating of BBB- is the lowest investment grade) that may be held. In general, a ten-percent limit on investments in a single company under Article 10 (2) is consistent with similar laws in other countries that do not want investment companies to acquire controlling interests in companies. However, in Macedonia in these early years of transition, a higher maximum might be appropriate. The maximum in the draft might unduly limit the size of investment companies because of the relatively small number of companies initially listed. Moreover, distribution of shares in any particular company may not be widespread, so that a much larger stake than ten percent may be needed to acquire a controlling interest.

The drafters may wish to consider two additional restrictions on investments. First, the law may prohibit investments in any business in which the management company has an interest, officers or directors of the management company have an interest, or the funds' investment advisors have an interest. The Securities Commission can make rules defining what is a disqualifying interest: a percentage of ownership, a monetary amount of ownership, employment, or management position. This prohibition is to prevent self-dealing and conflicts of interest in making investment decisions for the fund. Second, the law could prohibit investments in the depo bank's securities. [CEELI]

Opciski i terminski raboti

^len 11

Opciskite i terminskite raboti i drugi instrumenti i tehniki se dozvoleni samo so cel za osiguruvawe na pobaruvwata i na imotot na fondot, pri {to mora da se uva`uvaat na~elata od ~len 2 stav 1 na ovoj zakon.

* Vo ~len 11 da se zameni terminot "na~ela" so terminot "principi" zaradi usoglasuvawe so tekstot od ~len 2 stav 3. Od isti pri~ini namesto stav "1" da stoi stav "3". Vo istiot ~len treba da se oceniopravdanosta so opciski i terminski raboti da se zanimavaat i otvorenite i zatvorenite fondovi. Se ocenuva deka vo nerazvienite finansiski pazari vo po~etnata faza, so opcii i terminski raboti treba da se zanimavaat samo zatvorenite fondovi, zaradi pogolema za{tita na investitorite vo otvorenite fondovi. (MB)

* Some more detailed rules defining the eligible (derivative) instruments and transactions would be desirable. [SFBC]

Utvrduvawe na vrednosta na imotot na fondot

^len 12

(1) Vrednosta na imotot na fondot ja presmetuva i utvrduva depozitnata banka sekoj berzoven den, vrz osnova na kursnite vrednosti na negovite hartii od vrednost i depozitite vo finansiskite institucii, kako i drugite imotni vrednosti so odbivawe na obvrskite. Depozitnata banka ja utvrduva i vrednosta na hartiite od vrednost koi ne se izlo`eni za proda`ba na berzite. Metodite na procenka i utvrduvawe na vrednosta mora da odgovaraat na me|unarodno priznatite standardi. Za rabotite na procenka i utvrduvawe na vrednosta na imotot na fondot depozitnata banka mo`e da koristi i uslugi na drugi stru~ni institucii i sovetnici.

(2) Komisijata po potreba, mo`e da utvrdi i drugi poedinosti vo vrska so procenkata i utvrduvaweto na vrednosta na imotot na fondot.

* ^lenot 12 da se usoglasi so sodr`inata na ~lenot 8 stav 2 i so ~lenot 9 stav 1 i da se izbri{e odredbata so koja e predvideno deka depozitnata banka ja utvrduva i vrednosta na hartiite od vrednost koi ne se kotirani na berzite, zato a{to so ~len 8 i 9 e predvideno deka za imot na fondot se smetaat samo kotirani hartii od vrednost. (MB)

* Article 12 of the Law provides that the net asset value of a fund is calculated by the depository bank every trading day , on the basis of the market value of the fund's securities and its deposits in financial institution, as well as the value of other assets, after substracting liabilities. The Law does not, however, specify when during that day the shares are priced. By rule, we have adopted the concept of "forward pricing". [See Investment Company Act Rule 22c-1]. This means that mutual fund shares may only be sold and redeemed at the price next computed after receipt of the purchase or redemption request. Most funds price their securities at the end of the day (when the market closes). Thus, for example, if a redemption request is received at noon, the shareholder that submitted generally at the end of the day. Similarly, if a request is received after pricing has been completed on a certain day, the shareholder will receive the price that is computed next day.

The reason for requiring forward pricing is to prevent investors from taking unfair advantage of market movements. If, for example, shares were priced at mid-day, and investors received that price no matter when during that day they purchased or redeemed, investors purchasing at the end of the day in a rising market would be able to lock in automatic and riskless profits; similarly, in a falling market, investors redeeming at the end of the day would receive the higher, mid-day price. We acknowledge that forward pricing requires the issuance of fractional shares and has the disadvantage of not aloowing investors to know the exact price of the shares at the time a purchase or sale order is placed. On balance, however, our experience indicates that forward pricing provides the fairest means of pricing securities. [SEC]

* Art. 12-1 I wonder why the valuation/calculation of the NAV could not be done by the Company (or a Third party working for it) as well? This would, in my view, even be better (clear separation of functions between Company and depo Bank). At least, the Law should not make it compulsory for the Depo Bank to perform this function.

Art 12-1 From a systematical point of view, it might be better to regroup all powers of the Commission under Chapter VII "Control". [SFBC]

Zadol`itelni objavuvawa

^len 13

(1) Dru{tvoto e dol`no za sekoj fond so koj upravuva da objavi:

1. prospekt, sostaven spored odredbite na ~len 4 na ovoj zakon,

2. godi{ni finansiski izve{tai na fondot,

3. polugodi{ni finansiski izve{tai,

4. ceni na izdavawe i otkup na dokumentite za udel,

5. vrednost na fondot i na poedine~niot udel vo fondot,

6. prekin na otkupot na dokumentite za udel i na nivnata isplata.

(2) Prospektot i se podnesuva na Komisijata so baraweto za odobruvawe na statutot i zaedno so odobreniot statut se objavuva vo "Slu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija" i vo eden dneven vesnik, vo rok od sedum dena od denot na izdavaweto na odobrenieto za osnovawe na fondot.

(3) Godi{nite finansiski izve{tai se objavuvaat vo rok od tri meseci po istekot na prethodnata godina, a polugodi{nite vo rok od dva meseca po istekot na prvoto polugodie na tekovnata godina, vo "Slu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija" i vo eden dneven vesnik.

(4) Dru{tvoto e dol`no redovno, a najmalku dva pati mese~no, vo eden dneven vesnik da gi objavuva cenite na izdavawata i otkupot na dokumenti za udeli vo fondot so koj upravuva. Prekinot na otkupot na dokumentite za udeli i na nivnata isplata dru{tvoto mora bez odlagawe da go objavi vo "Slu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija" i vo eden dneven vesnik.

* Zaradi tro{ocite obvrskata za objavuvawe da bide vo edno glasilo (op{to ili specijalizirano). Dali mo`e da se sozdava obvrska za specijalizirano glasilo (stoi rizikot na golemi tro{oci). (MH)

* Disclosing changes in administration or in performance fees should also be mandatory. [EGRJ].



^len 14

(1) Otvoren fond e poseben imot bez svojstvo na pravno lice, {to vrz osnova na odobrenie na Komisijata go osnova dru{tvo za upravuvawe so fondovi, ~ij predmet na rabotewe e pribirawe na pari~ni sredstva preku proda`ba na dokumenti za udel vo fondot. Sredstvata na otvoreniot fond se vlo`uvaat soglasno so odredbite na ~len 2 stav 1 od ovoj zakon. Sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel, pokraj pravata na srazmeren del od dobivkata, imaat pravo vo sekoe vreme da baraat otkup na dokumentite za udel.

(2) Pari~nite sredstva na otvoreniot fond sobrani so izdavawe i javna proda`ba na dokumentite za udel, kako i imotot steknat so nivnoto vlo`uvawe, vklu~uvaj}i gi prihodite i pravata, go so~inuvaat otvoreniot fond, odnosno zasebniot imot vo zaedni~ka sopstvenost na site sopstvenici na dokumentite za udel.

(3) Pribiraweto na pari~nite sredstva se vr{i preku javna proda`ba na izdadenite dokumenti za udeli vo fondot edinstveno za pari.

* Stavocite "1" od ~lenovite 14 i 15 stilski da se podobrat. (MH)

* Art. 14-1 I wonder whether this definition is entirely in line with the definition given in Art. 2-1.

What seems to be missing is a definition of what "open-end" means exactly, as contrary to "closed-end"? Art. 13-4 states, that the prices of each (open-end) Fund must at least be published twice a month, which of course implies a valuation, of the assets (art. 12 remains silent about the valuation intervals), whereas pursuant to Art. 21-1 investors may ask for redemption "any time" which, pursuant to subsection 5, must be paid within 7 days. This seems to be the decisive "border-line" between open- and closed-ended funds. What if a Fund want to restrict redemption to say, twice a month only? I would recommend to clarify these questions within this article. [SFBC]

* Under Article 14 (1), an open-end fund is a separate trust of assets "without the attributes of being a legal person". The closed-en fund, on the other hand, is a joint stock company organized as are all other joint stock companies. The closed-end fund is subject to the provisions of law governing such companies as well as the provisions of this draft, which has specific requirements relating to the independence of the supervisory board of the closed-end fund. Further, with respect to the closed-end funds, the provisions of the General Corporate Law presumably provide shareholders with substantial rights and privileges, including the right to vote on a number of matters of interest to them. The draft does not provide holders of open-end fund shares with any of these protections. In the US, there are open-end mutual fund certificates, which are issued by unit investment trusts organized under a trust indenture withoout a board of directors. However, US statute and regulations afford holders of these certificates the same rights as the holders of shares in the closed-end fund. The right to approve or disapprove a contract with the management company is particularly important in this connection. The drafters must ensure that Article 14 (1)'s language does not open the fund to creditors. Calling the fund's assets a "separate trust" may have legal consequences as well, making the management company fiduciary for the investors. The fiduciary responsabilities may not be so well established in Macedonian law. The drafters need to think this throug carefully. [CCELI]

Osnovawe na otvoren fond

^len 15

(1) Dru{tvoto osnova otvoren fond so donesuvawe statut i izgotvuvawe prospekt vo soglasnost so odredbite na ~l. 3 i 4 od ovoj zakon, so sklu~uvawe na dogovor so depozitna banka vo soglasnost so odredbite na ~len 47 stav 1 od ovoj zakon, kako i so podnesuvawe na barawe do Komisijata za dobivawe odobrenie za osnovawe kon koe se prilo`uvaat statutot i prospektot na fondot i dogovorot so depozitnata banka.

(2) Baraweto od stav 1 od ovoj ~len gi sodr`i slednite podatoci:

1. imeto i sedi{teto na dru{tvoto,

2. imeto na fondot,

3. broj i datum na odobrenieto od ~len 15 na ovoj zakon.

(3) Kon baraweto se prilo`uva:

1. statutot na fondot,

2. prospektot na fondot,

3. dogovorot so depozitnata banka,

4. dokaz deka e uplaten propi{aniot nadomestok za dobivawe odobrenie za osnovawe.

Statut na otvoreniot fond

^len 16

Pokraj elementite od ~len 3 na ovoj zakon, statutot na otvoreniot fond mora da gi sodr`i i slednite podatoci:

1. visinata na dozvolenite tro{oci koi se odbivaat pri dodeluvaweto na dokumentite za udel i nivnata isplata.

2. pod koi uslovi i na koi mesta sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel mo`at da baraat isplata na vrednosta na udelite zaedno so nivniot otkup.


^len 17

Pokraj podatocite od ~len 4 na ovoj zakon, prospektot na otvoreniot fond mora da sodr`i i podatoci za:

1. postapkata i uslovite za otkup i isplata na dokumentite za udel i uslovite pod koi mo`e da se sopre nivniot otkup i isplata,

2. utvrduvaweto na cenata na dokumentite za udel pri nivniot otkup,

3. metodot i dinamikata na presmetuvawe na cenite,

4. tro{ocite na otkup i isplata na dokumentite za udel,

5. na~inot, mestoto i dinamikata na objavuvawe na cenite i tro{ocite,

6. postapkata i mestoto na isplata na dokumentite za udel pri nivniot otkup.

* Art. 17-1 Disclosing the complete method and dynamics of calculating the prices on the prospectus of open-end funds more cost than benefits; it is sufficient if this information is in the statute. [EGRJ]

* Art. 17 Point 6: Maybe receipt of payments should be allowed to banks as regulated entities only? (investor protection!). [SFBC]

Dokumenti za udel i odgovornost na sopstvenikot

^len 18

(1) So uplata na polnata cena na dokumentite za udel utvrdena vo soglasnost so ~len 30 stav 2 na ovoj zakon sopstvenikot na dokumenti za udel stanuva sopstvenik na srazmeren del na imotot na fondot.

(2) So dokumentite za udel pismeno se garantiraat pravata na sopstvenicite na dokumentite na udel sprema fondot. Dokumentite za udel se neograni~eno prenoslivi hartii od vrednost i glasat na ime.

(3) Dokumentite za udel mo`e da se izdavaat za eden ili pove}e udeli vo ist fond. Udelite vo fondot ne smeat da imaat razli~ni prava i mora da go opfa}aat celokupniot imot na fondot.

(4) So prenesuvawe na dokumentite za udel, nivniot sopstvenik se steknuva so site prava, pismeno zagarantirani vo dokumentot za udel, i so srazmerno u~estvo od proda`bite na imotot na fondot. Sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel vo fondot ne mo`at na drug na~in da raspolagaat so svojot srazmeren del vo imotot na fondot.

(5) Odgovornosta na sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel vo fondot e ograni~ena do vrednosta na udelite koi tie gi dr`at. Dru{tvoto ne e ovlasteno da prezema obvrski vo ime na sopstvenik na dokument za udel vo fondot.

* Vo ~len 18 stav 2 vo vtorata re~enica zborovite "dokumenti za udel" da se dodadat zborovite "vo smisla na ovoj zakon". So predlo`enata izmena se vr{i razgrani~uvawe vo odnos na udelot vo ZTD. Dokolku, se prifat predlogot od to~kata 1, potrebata od ovaa izmena }e otpadne.

Vo ~len 18, stav 2, da se oceni definicijata deka "Dokumentite za udel se neograni~eno prenoslivi hartii od vrednost", so ogled na faktot {to vo otvoreniot fond dokumentot za udel mo`e da se prenesuva samo pome|u sopstvenikot i Fondot, odnosno ima karakteristiki na ograni~eno prenosliva hartija od vrednost. (MB)

* Art. 18-1: Would it be useful to say that, contrary to stocks, units have no nominal value, as they all represent an equal share in all the assets, claims etc. of the Fund? As to the term "owner", I wonder whether the legal statuts of all investors as "mutual co-ownership" (Art. 14-2) would be of any practical value in case of bankruptcy of the Company or depo bank, as the assets can certainly not physically be divided among them, but must be sold and the proceeds divided among a considerable number of participants.

Art. 18-2: "Registered units". By requiring registered shares, the transferabiltiy of units is made more complicated. Why are bearer units not allowed as well? Could it be useful to allow units in book-entry-form as well instead of securities, or would this raise technical problems in Macedonia. [SFBC].

* Article 18 (2)'s sentence that the unit certificates are transferable registered certificates is inconsistent with the intent of the provision. Under an open-end fund, an owner sells units by redeeming from the fund, not by selling to another investor. If so, then the shares' transferability is restricted. If the unit certificates are to be registered certificates, there needs to be procedural provision for registering them, perhaps by reference to the Securities law. [CEELI]

Sodr`ina na dokumentite za udel vo fondot

^len 19

Dokumentite za udel vo fondot mora da sodr`at:

1. oznaka deka se raboti za otvoren fond,

2. nazivot na fondot, nazivot i sedi{teto na dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi,

3. seriskiot broj na dokumentot za udel,

4. brojot na udeli vo imotot na fondot na koi glasi dokumentot za udel,

5. imeto na sopstvenikot na dokumentot za udel,

6. obvrskite na izdava~ot, odnosno pravata na sopstvenikot na dokumentot za udel,

7. mestoto i datumot na izdavawe, i

8. potpisite na ovlastenite lica na dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovite i na depozitnata banka.

* Point 5: Name of the owner as units sometimes are bought and sold very quickly, I wonder whether this requirement is of any use. Moreover, contrary to stocks, units are often not traded on a secondary market but redeemed by the Depo Bank which issues them again to a new investor. [SFBC]

Izdavawe na dokumenti za udel

^len 20

(1) Dru{tvoto mo`e da izdava dokumenti za udel po dobivaweto na odobrenie od Komisijata soglasno ~len 3 stav 2 od ovoj zakon.

(2) Dokumentite za udel se izdavaat po pari~nata uplata na polnata cena na izdavaweto. Pari~nite sredstva, po odbivaweto na tro{ocite od stav 3 na ovoj ~len, bez odlagawe se vnesuvaat vo imotot na fondot. Ako dokumentite za udel se izdadeni, a vrednosta ne e vnesena vo imotot na fondot, dru{tvoto mora da go nadomesti iznosot {to nedostasuva.

(3) Cenata na izdavaweto na dokumentite za udel e vrednosta na u~estvoto vo imotot na fondot i iznosot za pokrivawe na tro{ocite za izdavawe utvrden so statutot.

* Art. 20-2: If an investor pays in money into the Fund, this money has to be invested which causes costs; are this costs to be borne by the "new-entrant" or by the community of all investors already in the fund? [SFBC]

Otkup na dokumentot za udel vo fondot

^len 21

(1) Sekoj sopstvenik na dokument za udel vo fondot mo`e vo sekoe vreme da bara otkup na dokumentot i na toj na~in da istapi od fondot. Cenata {to odgovara na vrednosta na udelot mora da se isplati bez odbitoci, ako takvi ne se izri~no predvideni so statutot.

(2) Vo statutot se utvrduvaat uslovite pod koi dru{tvoto mo`e da go prekine otkupot na dokumentite i toa vo slu~aj koga za{titata na interesite na sopstvenicite na dokumenti za udeli vo fondot toa spre~uvawe go pravi neophodno. Dodeka trae prekinot na otkup na dokumenti za udel zabraneto e da se izdavaat novi dokumenti za udel. Prekinot na otkup na dokumentite za udel dru{tvoto mora vedna{ da go prijavi kaj Komisijata i da go objavi vo "Slu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija" i vo eden dneven vesnik.

(3) Komsijata mo`e da mu nalo`i na dru{tvoto da go prekine otkupot na dokumentite za udel, ako toa e vo interes na za{titata na interesite na sopstvenicite na dokumenti za udeli vo fondot.

(4) Sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel ne mo`at da go koristat svoeto pravo od stavot 1 na ovoj ~len vo rok od edna godina od objavuvaweto na prviot javen povik za kupuvawe na dokumenti za udel vo fondot.

(5) Dru{tvoto mora da go isplati dokumentot za udel vo fondot najdocna sedmiot den po primaweto na baraweto od stav 1 na ovoj ~len.

* ^len 21-1: Dali bez najava ako stanuva zbor za pogolema vrednost?

^len 21-4: Mo`e da go odvra}a kupecot. (MH)

* Art. 21-4 Restricting withdrawals on open-end funds for 12 months after the investment can be a great disadvantage for investors, as they seek liquidity in the securities anf in this manner they can not transfer their investment to another manager, should the current manager have a poor performance. [EGRJ]

* Art. 21-2; Maybe a clear separation should be drawn between 2 kinds of stops of redemption:

Art. 21-3: Not just redemption, but the issue of new certificates should be suspended as well.

Art. 21-4: This "grace period" seems to me to be rather long. Why would an investor have to wait so long if the Fund Assets are invested in liquid and open markets? [SFBC]

* It is understandable why Macedonia may wish to provide for the suspension of the right to demand redemption of open-end units, but such provisions may unduly deter investors. Article 21 (4) prevents redemptions within first year of operation of a fund, and Article 24 (2) prohibits redemptions after the management company decides do dissolve the fund. Moreover, a fund may stop redemptions for reasons stated in the Statute of the Fund (Article 21 (2)). It might be helpful to allow the SEC to overrule a fund's decision to stop redemptions. Such a provision would mirror the SEC's authority in Article 21 to demand suspension of redemptions when necessary. The prospectus should prominently disclose that units cannot be redeemed within one year from the date of the first offering. [CEELI]

Raspredelba na dobivkata

^len 22

^istata dobivka na otvoreniot fond, po nalog na dru{tvoto, depozitnata banka im ja isplatuva na sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel srazmerno na nivnoto u~estvo vo imotot na fondot. ^istata dobivka se isplatuva za prethodnata godina, a za pokratki vremenski periodi, za koi se izraboteni finansiski izve{tai, mo`at da se isplatuvaat akontacii na u~estvoto vo dobivkata, vo soglasnost so statutot na fondot.

* Art. 22: I would like to recall that interim dividends should only be paid out with the approval of the auditors. [SFBC]

* Does Article 22 intend to make payment of prior year net income mandatory? This should be clarified. Some accepted standard of accounting principles is needed to control analysis and decisions about net income. Drafters should consider adding provisions authorizing automatic reinvestment of dividends, if the unit owner desires. [CEELI]

Otkaz i raspu{tawe na fondot

^len 23

(1) Dru{tvoto mo`e da go otka`e upravuvaweto so fondot so otkazen rok od 3 meseci. Rokot po~nuva da te~e od denot koga na site sopstvenici na dokumenti za udel im e dostaven otkaz vo pismena forma ili koga otkazot e objaven vo "Slu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija" i vo eden dneven vesnik.

(2) Pravoto na dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondot prestanuva koga }e se otvori ste~ajna postapka nad dru{tvoto i koga Komisijata }e go povle~e odobrenieto za rabotewe na dru{tvoto.

(3) Ako dru{tvoto, pokraj poradi ste~aj, prestane da raboti poradi nekoja druga pri~ina, depozitnata banka ima pravo vo ime na sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel da go otka`e dogovorniot odnos so dru{tvoto, bez po~ituvawe na otkazniot rok.

(4) So odobrenie na Komisijata, depozitnata banka ima pravo na otkaz i vo drugi slu~ai, ako dru{tvoto ne e vo sostojba da gi ispolnuva svoite obvrski, a osobeno:

1. ako vo rok od 3 meseci po objavuvaweto na prviot javen povik za kupuvawe na dokumenti za udel vo otvoreniot fond ne se sobrani i uplateni pari~ni sredstva vo vkupen iznos od najmalku .......... DEM vo denarska protivvrednost.

2. ako vrednosta na imotot na otvoreniot fond vo vremenski periodi so vkupno traewe od 6 meseci bila pod ........... DEM vo denarska protivvrednost.

(5) Ako dru{tvoto so otkazot ili so odzemawe na odobrenieto go izgubi pravoto za upravuvawe so fondot, pravoto na raspolagawe so imotot na fondot preminuva na depozitnata banka.

(6) Vo slu~aite od st. 1 do 4 na ovoj ~len depozitnata banka e dol`na vo rok od 3 meseci od denot na otkazot da go raspu{ti fondot i imotot da im go podeli na sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel. Vo istiot rok, so odobrenie na Komisijata, depozitnata banka mo`e da se otka`e od raspu{taweto na fondot i vo soglasnost so statutot na fondot pravoto na upravuvawe so nego da go prenese na nekoe drugo dru{tvo.

(7) Sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel nemaat pravo da baraat raspu{tawe na fondot.

* ^len 23-1: Dali sopstvenicite ne treba da participiraat vo ovaa odluka?

^len 23-4 to~ka 1: Rokot od 3 meseci e premnogu kus. (MH)

* Art. 23: Preliminary remark: it is not clear to me what the legal basis of the civil-law-relations between Company, Depo Bank and investors is. Is there, like in Switzerland and Germany, a "collective investment contract" with, on one side, Company and Depo Bank, and the investors on the other side? In this case, Company and/or Depo Bank must, if they want to cease thair activity, cancel this collective investment contract existing between themselves and each individual investot (there are no relations/obligations between the investors; they are like "bus passengers"!).

Art. 23-4: In my view, the Depo Bank, should, like the Company, also have the general right to cancel without a particular reason. [SFBC]

* Throughout the law, with Article 23 being an example, no possibility for a reorganization in bankruptcy is contemplated. While reorganization is rare in Central and Eastern European countries, it is available, and efforts are being made to encourage it. This draft law does not permit this valuable economic tool. Furthemore, the law conflicts with distributions as organizaed in the bankruptcy law for liquidations. The drafters should add an exception for the provisions of the bankruptcy law, so that the latter will control.

The depo bank needs clearer guidelines on when the bank may exrecise the right to cancel the contract with the company and take other steps contemplated in Article 23. The drafters might want to give the owners an option to change the management company in the event the original management losses its approval to manage the fund. Additionally, Article 23 (2) gives the SEC the authority to withdraw approval of the fund. However, there are no criteria or reasons for which the commission might withdraw approval. Criteria might include:

Also, there are no procedural provisions to give the company protection from arbitrary action by the SEC. This might be provided by reference to administrative law or the securities Law.

Under Article 23 (1), the three-month notice period could possibly start from three different dates: when owners get notice, when Official Gazette notice occurs, or when newspaper notice occur. There should be one date from which to start the three months. [CEELI]

Odluka za raspu{tawe na fondot i pravni posledici

^len 24

(1) Odlukata za raspu{tawe na otvoreniot fond depozitnata banka e dol`na bez odlagawe da ja objavi vo "Slu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija" i vo eden dneven vesnik i pismeno da gi izvesti site sopstvenici na dokumentite za udel vo otvoreniot fond.

(2) Od denot na donesuvawe na odlukata za raspu{tawe na otvoreniot fond sopstvenicite na dokumenti za udel vo fondot nemaat pravo da baraat isplata na udelot so otkup na dokumentite za udel.

* ^len 24-1: Da se objavuva samo vo edno glasilo zaradi tro{oci. (MH)

* Art. 24-2: From the time of cancellation on, any further issuing of units should be forbidden as well. [SFBC]

Pretvorawe na imotot vo pari i negova raspredelba

^len 25

Po donesuvaweto na odlukata za raspu{tawe na otvoreniot fond depozitnata banka go pretvora siot imot na otvoreniot fond vo pari. Od pari~nata masa depozitnata banka mu gi isplatuva na dru{tvoto tro{ocite za upravuvawe so fondot, gi nadomestuva sopstvenite tro{oci vo vrska so raspu{taweto na fondot, ako toa statutot na fondot go predviduva, a ostatokot im go isplatuva na sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel vo otvoreniot fond, srazmerno na udelot vo imotot na fondot na koj tie glasat.

* Final payment should be made subject to approval by the Commission which has to check (through its own or external auditors) whether the winding-up has been made correctly and in good order. [SFBC]



^len 26

(1) Zatvoren fond e akcionersko dru{tvo {to, vrz osnova na odobrenie od Komisijata, go osnova i so nego upravuva dru{tvo za upravuvawe so fondovi. Edinstven predmet na rabotewe na zatvoreniot fond e pribirawe na pari~ni sredstva i stvari po pat na javna ponuda na svoi neograni~eno prenoslivi akcii i vlo`uvawe na tie sredstva vrz osnova na na~elata od ~len 2 stav 1 na ovoj zakon.

(2) Na zatvoreniot fond se primenuvaat odredbite na Zakonot za trgovskite dru{tva ako so ovoj zakon ne e poinaku uredeno.

* Vo ~len 26 to~ka 1 da se zameni terminot "na~ela" so terminot "principi" zaradi usoglasuvawe so tekstot od ~len 2 stav 3. Od istite pri~ini namesto "stav 1" da stoi "stav 3". (MB)

* In Swiss Law, closed-end funds are not dealt with in the Investment Fund legislation; I therefore cannot make many remarks on this Article. I would, however, suggest that the distinction between open- and closed-end funds should be made more clearly, e.g. by stating that the value of shares in a closed-end-fund depends on supply and demand only and is, contrary to an open-ended fund, not calculated on the basis of the net asset value of the Fund. In order to protect shareholders, I would suggest that the listing of the shares be compulsory, in order to enable investors to get in and out of the (closed-end) Fund. Maybe it might also be useful to obligate the Management Company to publish the value of the assets held by the Fund on a regular basis in order to facilitate comparison of portfolio value and share-prices of the closed-end-funds. [SFBC]

* It is difficult to follow the steps to organize a closed-end fund. A reading f the draft law sugests that founders first form a joint stock company, following the law for corporate organization and trading company law pursuant to Article 26, and contract with depo bank. Second, the company issues shares and receives founding equity money under Article 29 and Article 30 (2). Third, founding equity is registered with the court register in accordance with Article 27 (3.5). Fourth, the company applies for and obtains approval of the SEC pursuant to Article 27. Fifth, public shares are registered pursuant to Article 30. Finally, public shares are issued under Article 31. Is there a two-step collection of funds: one, the founding equity, the other, the public subscriptions? Article 30 (2) requires payment for shares before registration with the court. Article 27 (3.5) conptemplates court registration before SEC approval. It is unfair to ask people to invest before the requisite approvals are obtained. However, Article 31 (1) mandates that the public stock issue and money collection come last, after the SEC approval. This is incosistent with Article 30 (2). These procedures could be more clearly expressed.

In the case of both open-end and closed-end funds, perhaps through commission regulations, should establish net worth requirements for the management companies that should apply initially and continually. Financial information about the management company offering the investment fund should also be made available to the public on a regular basis. The provisions of Article 27 (3.5) seem inadequate for this purpose. A one-time approval even by a court will not provide much protection to the investors against weakly established management companies. The documents or required proofs in Article 27 (3.5.) should be specified in the law or SEC rules so that there is uniform treatment of all applicants. The item could read "other documents and proofs as may be required by SEC rule". Also, under Article 27 (2), the names, addresses, and biographical information of the joint stock company's directors and officers also should be reported with appropriate assuarances that they are not convicted felons or violators of the securities laws.

In Article 31 93), the fund management company is liable if a subscriber for closed-end shares is unable to pay. Article 20 (2) is not clear, but the article may be intended to require similar liability in the case of open-end funds. There is also a limit in Article 32 on organization fees for closed-end funds, but apparently not for open-end funds, and a limit in Article 46 on management fees. Macedonia must weigh the need for such provisions against the discentives raised for the management companies. [CEELI]

Osnovawe na zatvoren fond

^len 27

(1) Zatvoren fond se osnova od strana na dru{tvo za upravuvawe so fondovi so usvojuvawe na statut i izgotvuvawe prospekt na fondot vo soglasnost so ~l. 3 i 4 na ovoj zakon, prezemawe na akciite vo soglasnost so ~len 22 stav 2 na ovoj zakon, so sklu~uvawe dogovor so depozitna banka vo soglasnost so ~len 47stav 1 na ovoj zakon, imenuvawe na ~lenovite na upravata i prviot nadzoren odbor i podnesuvawe barawe do Komisijata za izdavawe odobrenie za osnovawe.

(2) Baraweto na odobrenie za osnovawe na zatvoren fond i za upravuvawe so fondot mora da sodr`i:

1. naziv i sedi{te na dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi,

2. naziv i sedi{te na zatvoreniot fond,

3. broj i datum na izdadenoto odobrenie za vr{ewe na dejnostite od ~len 15 na ovoj zakon,

4. ime i prezime, prestojuvali{te i edinstven mati~en broj na fizi~kite lica koi se prvi ~lenovi na nadzorniot odbor na zatvoreniot fond,

(3) Kon baraweto od stav 2 na ovoj ~len se prilo`uvaat:

1. statutot na fondot,

2. prospektot na fondot,

3. odlukata za imenuvawe na ~lenovite na prviot nadzoren odbor i pismenite izjavi na ~lenovite na prviot nadzoren odbor za prifa}awe na imenuvaweto,

4. dogovorot so depozitnata banka,

5. izvod od sudskiot registar od koj e vidlivo deka dru{tvoto gi ispolnuva uslovite vo vrska so visinata na osnovniot kapital od ~len 15 stav 1 to~ka 1 na ovoj zakon,

6. spesimen na akciite i obrascite za zapi{uvawe,

7. dokaz deka e uplaten propi{aniot nadomestok za dobivawe odobrenie za osnovawe,

8. drugi dokumenti so koi se doka`uva deka dru{tvoto gi ispolnuva uslovite za upravuvawe so fondovi.

Statut na zatvoreniot fond

^len 28

Statutot na zatvoreniot fond, pokraj elementite od ~len 3 na ovoj zakon, mora da sodr`i i:

1. zborovi "zatvoren fond" vo nazivot na fondot,

2. odredbi za upravata i za nadzorniot odbor na zatvoreniot fond,

3. odredbi za prenesuvawe na pravoto na upravuvawe so zatvoreniot fond i pravoto na glas od akciite i drugite prava koi proizleguvaat od imotot na zatvoreniot fond na dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi.

* Art. 28: The statute of a closed-end fund should also contain the length of time the fund expects to be operating, as the duration of a closed-end fund depends upon investment maturity. [EGRJ]

Osnova~ki kapital na zatvoreniot fond

^len 29

(1) Najniskiot nominalen iznos na osnova~kiot kapital na zatvoreniot fond iznesuva ........... DEM vo denarska protivvrednost.

(2) Po upisot vo sudskiot registar, zatvoreniot fond mo`e da go promeni iznosot na osnovnata glavnica samo preku zgolemuvawe na osnovnata glavnica od sredstvata na zatvoreniot fond i preku smaluvawe na osnovnata glavnica, vo soglasnost so odredbite na Zakonot za trgovskite dru{tva.

(3) Po isklu~ok od stav 2 na ovoj ~len, zatvoreniot fond mo`e da ja zgolemi osnovnata glavnica po pat na vlogovi, vrz osnova na odobrenie na Komisijata.

* ^len 29 stav 2 i 3 da se usoglasat so re{enieto vo Zakonot za trgovski dru{tva i so op{tata karakteristika na zatvoreniot fond deka goleminata na glavnicata na zatvoreniot fond e ograni~ena i vo princip pretstavuva ednokratno, a ne kontinuirano emitirawe na kapital. (MB)

Akcii na zatvoreniot fond

^len 30

(1) Akciite na zatvoreniot fond glasat na ime i se neograni~eno prenoslivi. Zatvoreniot fond ne smee da izdava povlasteni akcii, nitu akcii so razli~ni prava.

(2) Akciite na zatvoreniot fond mo`at da se pla}aat so pari~ni sredstva, so hartii od vrednost i so prava i moraat da bidat uplateni vo celost pred upisot na zatvoreniot fond vo sudskiot registar, odnosno pred upisot na zgolemuvaweto na osnova~kiot kapital.

(3) Zatvoreniot fond ne smee da steknuva sopstveni akcii.

(4) Akciite izdadeni sprotivno na stav 1 na ovoj ~len se ni{tovni. Ni{tovna e i sekoja pravna rabota so koja zatvoreniot fond steknal sopstveni akcii.

* Vo ~len 30 da se dodade nov stav 5, koj bi glasel: "akciite na Zatvoreniot fond kotiraat na Berza", so ogled deka edna od osnovnite karakteristiki na Zatvoreniot fond e akciite na fondot da kotiraat na Berzata, kako i akciite na ostanatite trgovski dru{tva. Toa obezbeduva pazarno formirawe na cenata na akciite na Zatvoreniot fond. (MB)

* In considering the advisability of Article 30 (3), we point out that there may be circumstances where repurchase of shares by a closed-end fund may be in the best interests of shareholders; for example, where there is limited liquidity for the shares and they are trading at a discount from net asset value. U.S. practice is to permit such repurchases, subject to certain safeguards. (See Investment Company Act Section 23 c-1 and Rules 23c3-1 23c-2 and 23c-3. [SEC]

Zapi{uvawe na akcii na zatvoreniot fond

^len 31

(1) Zapi{uvaweto na akcii vrz osnova na javen povik za zapi{uvawe vo soglasnost so ~len 4 na ovoj zakon ne smee da zapo~ne pred Komisijata da izdade odobrenie za osnovawe na zatvoreniot fond.

(2) Zapi{uvaweto i uplatata na akcii se vr{i kaj depozitna banka. Obrazecot za zapi{uvawe na akciite, pokraj podatocite utvrdeni so Zakonot za trgovskite dru{tva, sodr`i i:

1. potpisi na ovlastenite lica na dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi i depozitnata banka,

2. izjava na zapi{uva~ot na akcii deka e zapoznat i soglasen so statutot i so prospektot na zatvoreniot fond.

(3) Dokolku zatvoreniot fond pretrpi {teta od strana na zapi{uva~ koj ne e sposoben za pla}awe na zapi{anite akcii, za takvata {teta odgovara dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi .

Tro{oci za osnovawe na zatvoreniot fond

^len 32

So statutot na zatvoreniot fond mo`e da se utvrdi deka dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi ima pravo na nadomestuvawe na tro{ocite za osnovaweto na fondot od imotot na zatvoreniot fond, no najmnogu do iznos od 2% od vrednosta na osnova~kiot kapital pri osnovaweto na zatvoreniot fond, ili dru{tvoto tro{ocite na osnovaweto da gi vkalkulira vo cenata na izdavaweto na akcii.

* The concept of "founding equity" in Article 32 is not clear. It seems that there will be a relativley small amount of money to pay expenses for establishing the fund and certain operating capital. However, using only two percent of the founding equity for organizational expenses contemplates a large amount of founding equity. Where does this money come from, the founder or the public? Is the "founding equity" to be the investment fund? If so, is it increased with the public issue after SEC approval? Is the Trading Company Law procedure for increasing equity appropriate in the mutual fund context? [CEELI]

Upravuvawe so zatvoreniot fond

^len 33

(1) So zatvoreniot fond, vo negovo ime i za negova smetka upravuva dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi, vrz osnova na statutot i odredbite na ovoj zakon.

(2) Upravata na zatvoreniot fond ima dva ~lena (direktori) koi gi imenuva dru{tvoto. ^lenovi na upravata mo`at da bidat lica koi gi ispolnuvaat uslovite od ~len 15 stav 1 to~ka 2 na ovoj zakon.

(3) Nadzorniot odbor na zatvoreniot fond ima najmalku pet ~lenovi. ^lenovite na nadzorniot odbor mora da bidat nezavisni stru~waci i da gi ispolnuvaat uslovite od ~len 15 stav 1 to~ka 2 na ovoj zakon. ^lenovi na nadzorniot odbor ne mo`at da bidat lica vraboteni vo dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi i vo depozitna banka, nitu licata koi vo tie pravni lica se ~lenovi na upravi ili nadzorni odbori ili koi se ~lenovi na pove}e od dva nadzorni odbora.

(4) ^lenovite na nadzorniot odbor na zatvoreniot fond zaedni~ki go zastapuvaat zatvoreniot fond sprema dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi.

(5) Sobranieto na zatvoreniot fond imenuva 2/3 od ~lenovite na nadzorniot odbor, a 1/3 imenuva dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi.

* Art. 33-(2) and (3): This article states that in order for a person to be member of the managing board of a fund, he/she has to fulfill the conditions established in article 15 (1), which actually refers to provisions to establish an open-end fund, and, therefore, this conditions are not very clear. [EGRJ]

* Vo ~len 33, stav 2 i 3, namesto zborovite "~len 15" da stoi "~len 38". (MB).

* Nedostasuva koi organi gi imaat fondovite i so koi nadle`nosti? (MH)

Vaqda istite onie kako i sekoe a.d. ?!

* The difference in roles between the supervisory board and managing board of a closed-end fund as described in Article 33 is confusing. Article 38, whcih discusses a "managing body", does not clarify the situation. The selection and number of the supervisory board is also confusing. If one-third the members of the board are nominated by the fund management company, can these members effectively advocate against the management company? Article 33 (5) requires fractions for board membereship that will not work unless the number of directors is divisible by three. A more positive definition of the responsability and authority of the supervisory board is needed. The phrase represent against is unclear in Article 33 (4). The relatioship between the two boards should not be adversarial. Is the supervisory board to be advisory or have power to control the managing board and enforce will?

Article 33 does not define independent experts. Perhaps this definition could be done by rule of the commission. A legal definition would have to be very broad to encompass the many possible kinds of funds. A particular fund may need certain specialties related to its investment objectives and policies. Independence should be defined to exclude people who are business partners, affiliates, or relatives of those in control of the management company. [CEELI]


^len 34

(1) Dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi zadol`itelno najmalku edna{ mese~no go izvestuva nadzorniot odbor na zatvoreniot fond za kupenite i prodadenite hartii od vrednost i stvarite vo ime i za smetka na fondot, kako i za prihodite od imotot na fondot.

(2) Po barawe od nadzorniot odbor na zatvoreniot fond, dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi mora da dava izvestuvawa i za sostojbata na pazarot na hartii od vrednost i za drugi okolnosti koi se bitni za ocenka na politikata na vlo`uvawa.

Raspredelba na dobivkata

^len 35

(1) Dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi, vo soglasnost so statutot, mu predlaga na sobranieto na zatvoreniot fond raspredelba na dobivkata na fondot i po izgotvuvaweto na finansiskite izve{tai i odlukata donesena od strana na sobranieto dava nalog do depozitnata banka za isplata na dobivkata na akcionerite na zatvoreniot fond.

(2) ^istata dobivka se isplatuva za prethodnata godina, a za pokusi vremenski periodi, za koi se izraboteni finansiski izve{tai, mo`e da se isplatuvaat akontacii na u~estvo vo dobivkata, vo soglasnost so statutot na fondot i odlukata na sobranieto na zatvoreniot fond.

* Article 35 (1) suggests that there is a "general meeting" of the fund without specifying who is meeting. The article also suggests that proposals will be made, without providing for who will vote and how. It is unclear what is inteded here. [CEELI]

Otkaz i likvidacija

^len 36

(1) Dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi mo`e da go otka`e upravuvaweto so fondot, so otkazan rok od tri meseci. So istiot otkazen rok upravuvaweto so fondot mo`e da go otka`e i sobranieto na zatvoreniot fond. Otkazite imaat pravno dejstvo od denot koga po predlog na nadzorniot odbor na zatvoreniot fond Komisijata izdade odobrenie na drugo dru{tvo za upravuvawe so fondovi da upravuva so zatvoreniot fond.

(2) Pravoto na dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondot prestanuva i so denot na otvorawe ste~ajna postapka nad dru{tvoto i so denot na kone~nosta na re{enieto na Komisijata so koe se povlekuva odobrenieto za rabotewe na dru{tvoto.

(3) Vo slu~aite od stav 2 na ovoj ~len, pravata na upravuvawe i raspolagawe so stvari od imotot na zatvoreniot fond preminuvaat na depozitnata banka.

(4) Dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi mora vo rok od sedum dena od priemot na odlukata so koja Komisijata mu go odzela odobrenieto za upravuvawe so zatvoreniot fond, odnosno od denot na otvoraweto na ste~ajnata postapka, site raboti vo vrska so upravuvaweto so imotot na fondot da gi prenese na depozitnata banka.

(5) Sobranieto na zatvoreniot fond mo`e vo rok od tri meseci da odlu~i da go prenese pravoto na upravuvawe so fondot na drugo dru{tvo za upravuvawe so fondovi, koe mora vo istiot rok da podnese barawe do Komisijata za odobrenie da upravuva so fondot. Na baraweto za izdavawe odobrenie na soodveten na~in se primenuvaat odredbite na ~len 37 st. 2 i 3 i ~len 3 stav 2 na ovoj zakon.

(6) Ako dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi od stav 5 na ovoj ~len ne podnese barawe za izdavawe odobrenie za upravuvawe, depozitnata banka podnesuva do nadle`niot sud predlog za otvoawe postapka za likvidacija na zatvoreniot fond.

(7) Likvidatorite na fondot gi imenuva depozitnata banka. Depozitnata banka mo`e za likvidatori da gi imenuva i ~lenovite na upravata na zatvoreniot fond, vo soglasnost so zakon.

* Vo ~len 36, to~ka 5, namesto "~len 37" da stoi "~len 27". (MB)

* Article 36 (1) seems to provide that the fund management company or the general meeting can cancel the management contract on three-months notice. However, it appears that this is not effective until the commission approves another management company to manage the fund. This raises the possibility of a long, or even permanent, continuation of a management company after the company, or the fund members, wish a change. Perhaps some provision could be made for a temporary appointement, or, perhaps, the depo bank could perform this function until a replacement is found. [CEELI]



^len 37

(1) Dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi e trgovsko dru{tvo vo smisla na Zakonot za trgovskite dru{tva, osnovano vo praven oblik na akcionersko dru{tvo ili dru{tvo so ograni~ena odgovornost, ~ij edinstven predmet na rabotewe e osnovawe i upravuvawe so fondovi, odnosno vlo`uvawe pari~ni sredstva vo svoe ime i za zaedni~ka smetka na sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udeli na otvorenite fondovi i vo ime i za smetka na akcionerite na zatvorenite fondovi, kako i upravuvawe so tie sredstva spored na~elata od ~len 2 stav 1 na ovoj zakon.

(2) Ako dru{tvoto e osnovano vo oblik na akcionersko dru{tvo, mo`e da izdava samo akcii koi glasat na ime.

(3) Edno dru{tvo mo`e da upravuva so pove}e fondovi.

* Vo ~len 37, to~ka 1, da se zameni terminot "na~ela" so terminot "principi" zaradi usoglasuvawe so tekstot od ~len 2 stav 3. Od isti pri~ini namesto "stav 1" da stoi "stav 3". (MB)

* Art. 37: Are there no specific capital requirements for the C(ompany)? See IFO 15-16. [SFBC]

Odobrenie za rabotewe na dru{tvoto

^len 38

(1) Dru{tvoto mo`e da zapo~ne so rabota po dobivaweto odobrenie od Komisijata. Komisijata mu izdava na dru{tvoto odobrenie za rabotewe ako dru{tvoto kon baraweto za izdavawe na odobrenie prilo`i dokazi za ispolnuvawe na slednite uslovi:

1. osnovniot kapital uplaten vo momentot na podnesuvaweto na baraweto za izdavawe na odobrenie da iznesuva najmalku ...... DEM vo denarska protivvrednost,

2. vo dru{tvoto da se vraboteni najmalku dvajca ~lenovi na upravata (direktori), koi imaat soodvetna dozvola za vodewe na dru{tvoto izdadena od Komiijata. ^len na upravata ne mo`e da bide lice:

- osudeno za krivi~no delo predizvikuvawe ste~aj, povreda na obvrskata za vodewe na delovni knigi, o{tetuvawe na doveritelite, davawe pogodnosti na doveritelite, zloupotreba vo postapkata na prisilno poramnuvawe ili ste~aj, neovlasteno otkrivawe ili pribavuvawe na delovna tajna ili izmama, za vreme od pet godini po pravosilnosta na presudata so koja e osudeno, vo koe vreme ne se smeta vremeto pominato na izdr`uvawe na kaznata, ili

- protiv koe e izre~ena merka na zabrana za vr{ewe na zanimawe koe vo potpolnost ili delumno e opfateno so predmetot na rabotewe na dru{tvoto, dodeka trae zabranata.

3. statutot na dru{tvoto, pokraj rabotite na vlo`uvawa na sopstven imot, da dozvoluva osnovawe i upravuvawe so fondovi, odnosno vlo`uvawe na pari~ni sredstva vo svoe ime i za smetka na zatvoreniot fond i obavuvawe na sporedni raboti povrzani so toa, vklu~uvaj}i dr`ewe na udeli vo drugi dru{tva,

4. da e imenuvan ovlasten revizor,

5. da e uplaten propi{aniot nadomest za dobivawe odobrenie od strana na Komisijata.

(2) Za baraweto za odobrenie za rabotewe Komisijata odlu~uva vo rok od 60 dena od denot na negovoto podnesuvawe. Ako Komisijata vo toj rok ne donese odluka za baraweto za odobrenie za rabotewe, se smeta deka baraweto e odobreno.

(3) Ako nekoj od uslovite utvrdeni vo stav 1 na ovoj ~len prestane da postoi, Komisijata mo`e na dru{tvoto da mu go odzeme odobrenieto za rabotewe.

* Article 38 of the Law requires that a fund management company be approved by the SEC of the Republic of Macedonia. We note that we have a separate statute, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act"), that requires the registration of fund management companies ("investment advisers"). The Advisers Act requires advisers to, among other things, maintain certain books and records which are listed by rules under that Act, consent to periodic inspections, and make certain disclosures to clients. We strongly suggest that the Law explicitly grant the Macedonian SEC the power to inspect fund management companies and to take any action necessary to enforce the Law and rules adopted thereafter.

We also suggest similar grants of authority to Macedonian SEC in connection with inspections of funds and their personnel. Recent amendments to the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment Company Act") require funds to maintain such records as the US SEC may prescribe as "necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors," require investment advisors to maintain records that are necessary or appropriate to record the adviser's transactions with the fund, and provide that such records are subject to examination by the US SEC or its staff. Section 207 of the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996. [SEC]

* Art. 38, 1), point 4: I found no provisions in the Law about the conditions under which the Commission may authorize auditors to audit Funds and their C.

Art. 38-2: Once again, I wonder whether this time limit does not place an unnecessary burden on the Commission. I oppose even more strongly against the provision that in case of no decision the application is deemed to be approved. At least, the Commission should decide when the time limit begins to run. [SFBC]

* Article 38 addresses approval of the management company. Approval is important to prevent unscrupulous and incompetent individuals from playing an important role regarding investment companies. Article 38 specifies grounds for disqualification of a member of the managing body of the management company. The drafters may have intended to include the same grounds for disqualification in Article 33, regarding supervisory board and managing board of the closed-end fund, by erroneously referring to Article 15 when the drafters probably meant to refer to Article 38 (1.2).

Article 38(1) seems inadequate as a measure of performance. There should be some standard for commission approval and some method for judicial review if the commission improperly refuses to approve a qualified company. There needs to be some method for resolving evidentary disputes between citizens and the commission. In the paragraph dealing with disqulalifying crimes, perhaps a more general category such as "felony" would help to broaden the prohibited past activities. Also, prior "suspensions" by the commission might be ground for denial. Articles 38 92) and (3) seem incompatible. First, the approval is automatic after sixty days have passed. Then in article 38 (4), the commission has the power to withdraw approval if the fund manager becomes unqualified. Does this happen even if "approval" was never given in the first place? This is another reason not to permit automatic approval after the passage of sixty days. The commission should not only approve selection of depo banks but the commission should also have the authority to cancel the selection and terminate the relationship between the company and the depo bank. The commission needs some discretion on approval of applications. Sixty days may be too short, and Article 3 (2) and Article 38 92) should permit an extension for cause. Also, it may be better to specify "within 60 days of its receipt" rather than "within 60 days of acceptance of the application by the Commission", because the commission may "receive" an application that is incomplete or legally invalid. [CEELI]

Za{tita na upotrebata na nazivi vo firmata

^len 39

(1) Zborovite:"dru{tvo za upravuvawe so fondovi", "uprava na fondovi", "investitor", "invest" ili "investira", sami ili zaedno so drugi zborovi, vo nazivot na firmata ili negoviot dodatok smeat da go upotrebuvaat samo dru{tvata i fondovite osnovani vo soglasnost so ovoj zakon, i toa samo za ozna~uvawe na predmetot na rabotewe i za reklamni celi.

(2) Stav 1 na ovoj ~len ne se odnesuva na dru{tva koi zborovite: "upravuva so fondovi", "investicija", "investitor"ili "investitori" gi upotrebuvaat vo kontekst koj go isklu~uva prividot deka sodr`inata na predmetot na raboteweto e naso~ena kon osnovawe i upravuvawe so investicioni fondovi odnosno vlo`uvawe pari~ni sredstva vo svoe ime i za zaedni~ka smetka na sopstvenicite na udelite vo fondot i upravuvawe so tie sredstva.

* Ima objasnuva~ki karakter, a ne normativen. (MH)

* Art. 39: In my view, this protection should also be given to the Fund; other investment vehicles should not be allowed to call themselves a "Fund". [SFBC]

Dejnost na dru{tvato

^len 40

(1) Dru{tvoto e dol`no raboteweto so posebniot imot na fondot da go vodi so vnimanie na dobar stopanstvenik, nezavisno od depozitnata banka i isklu~ivo vo interes na sopstvenicite na udelite vo fondot odnosno akcionerite, vrz osnova na statutot na fondot, odredbite na ovoj zakon, pridr`uvaj}i se kon na~elata od ~len 2 stav 1 na ovoj zakon.

(2) ^lenovite i akcionerite na dru{tvoto, ~lenovite na upravata i nadzorniot odbor na dru{tvoto i site lica koi vo nego se vraboteni ili za nego vr{at postojani ili povremeni raboti vrz osnova na poseben dogovor, dol`ni se da ja ~uvaat tajnosta za rabotite na dru{tvoto.

(3) Podatocite za sopstvenicite na dokumenti za udeli i na akcii, uplatite i isplatite se delovna tajna i mo`at da se soop{tuvaat samo vrz osnova na sudski nalog.

(4) Odredbite od st. 2 i 3 na ovoj ~len ne se odnesuvaat na obvrskite na dru{tvoto za davawe podatoci i izvestuvawa na Komisijata zaradi vr{ewe na nadzorot vrz raboteweto na dru{tvoto i na davaweto podatoci na centralnata depozitna institucija zaradi evidentirawe na akciite.

* Art. 40-2: The penalty provisions (Art. 53) should provide for sanctions in case of violation of this clause.

Art. 40-3: What right of information do the unit-owners have in other cases? [SFBC]

* Article 40 (2)'s secrecy provision may be too restrictive. This restriction may unnecessarily restrict or discourage potential investors. What if an employee or board member needs to expose violations of laws or regulations? What if a competitor invests?

Article 40 (3) must be carefully though out. Publicity is an important sanction against poor management, fraudulent dealing, self-dealing, churning, excess fees, and other investment management abuses. A law generally making secret all management company activities undercuts this sanction. Important disclosure have to be made to the share owners as well as to the SEC and depo bank. Prospective investors need to know information about the fund, its assets, its performance, expenses, earnings, and its management. To the extent it is desirable to keep confidential the identities of share owners, Article 40 (3) could specifically protect their identities. There is really no reason tolegally keep secret payments, disbursements, and any other "data" about investors, If identities are released to the SEC and the depo bank, these two entities also should be protected legally in keeping the investors' identities secret. [ CEELI]

Pravo na raspolagawe, zabraneti dejstvija

^len 41

(1) Dru{tvoto ima pravo vo svoe ime da raspolaga so imotot na otvoreniot fond i vo ime i za smetka na zatvoreniot fond so negoviot imot, vo soglasnost so odredbite na ovoj zakon i stututot na fondot, kako i da gi ostvaruva site prava {to proizleguvaat od niv, so slednite ograni~uvawa:

1. dru{tvoto ne smee za smetka na sopstvenicite na otvoreniot ili na zatvoreniot fond da odobruva pari~ni zaemi, nitu da prezema garantni dogovorni obvrski,

2. stvarite koi pripa|aat na imotot na fondot ne smeat da se zalo`uvaat ili na nekoj drug na~in da se optovaruvaat, nitu smee da se prenesuva pravoto na sopstvenost vrz niv so cel za obezbeduvawe na pobaruvawata kon doveritelite. Pravnite raboti sprotivni na ovaa odredba se bez pravno dejstvo sprema sopstvenicite na udeli na otvoreniot fond odnosno sprema zatvoreniot fond,

3. dru{tvoto ne smee za zaedni~ka smetka na sopstvenicite na udeli na otvoreniot fond, nitu vo ime i za smetka na zatvoreniot fond, da prodava hartii od vrednost, ako hartiite od vrednost vo momentot na sklu~uvaweto na zdelkata ne vleguvaat vo imotot na fondot. Povredata na ovaa zabrana ne vlijae na polnova`nosta na taa pravna rabota.

(2) Licata od ~len 17 stav 2 na ovoj zakon ne mo`at stvarite na fondot, za smetka na fondot, nitu da gi kupat od dru{tvoto nitu da gi prodadat na dru{tvoto. Toa ne va`i za steknuvaweto dokumenti za udel vo otvoreniot fond i nivniot povrat i za steknuvaweto akcii vo zatvoreniot fond.

* Vo stav 2 od ovoj ~len namesto "licata od ~len 17 stav 2" treba da stoi "licata od ~len 40 stav 2" na ovoj zakon. (VK)

* Article 41 of the Law prohibits certain persons from engaging in certain activities with the fund for which it serves as manager. These activities include leveraging the fund's assets (Article 41 (1) of the Law) and buying assets in kind from, or selling assets in kind to, the fund.

The Investment Company Act also contains a number of provisions designed to police the conflicts of interest inherent in fund management. One ser of provisions concerns fund governance, and a second set of provisions prohibits certain transactions between a fund and its "affiliated persons", a term that is defined to include a fund's investment adviser. These provisions are among the most important in the Investment Company Act (ICA).

Section 17 of the ICA prohibits certain transactions involving funds and their affiliated persons. An affiliated person of a mutual fund is defined in Section 2 (a) (3) of the ICA to include directors, officers, co-partners, employees, and the fund's investment adviser. In addition, it includes any person owing 5% of the fund's voting securities, any person in which the fund owns 5% or more of the voting securities, and any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the fund. Affiliated persons of affiliated persons (e.g., an affiliated person of the fund's invetsment adviser) also are treated in the same manner as affiliated person under Section 17.

Briefly, Section 17 is designed to address the following types of transactions:

The ICA generally requires a fund an order from the US SEC before the fund can engage in a transaction that is prohibited by Section 17. The US SEC has adopted rules permitting board of directors to approve ceratin affiliated transactions under conditions and circumstances designed to protect the fund. (See e.g. ICA Rule 17a-7)

Section 10 (a) of the ICA requires that at least 40% of the board of directors of a fund consist of individuals who are not "interested persons" (e.g., individuals who are not affiliated with the sponsor of the fund). (Section 2 (a) (19) defines the term "interested person" to include, among others, any affiliated person of the investment company, any member of the immediate family of any natural person who is an affiliated person of such company, and any broker-dealer registered with the US SEC). Such individuals, referred to as the board's independent directors, are expected to protect the interests of fund shareholders by furnishing an independent check upon management. The ICA assignes specific responsabilities to a fund's independent directors, such as the evaluation and approval of the fund's advisory contract, and any renewals of such contracts, (Section 15 (a) and 15 (c) of the 1940 Act) and the selection of the fund's independent public accountant. (Section 32 (a) (1) of the 1940 Act. You may wish to consider including similar corporate governance provisions in the Law.

Shareholders also play an important role under our system of regulation. In addition to any voting rights they may have under state law, the ICA provides essential investor protections by requiring that shareholders approve the advisory contract between the fund and its investment advier (including the fee to be charged by the adviser) and any amendments to that contract. (See Section 15 (a) of the ICA) Further, any fundamental changes to the fund's investment policies must be approved by shareholders. (See Section 13 of the ICA) This provision prevents the fund from changing its nature without the prior approval of shareholders.

In addition, we note that the ICA generally prohibits a fund from purchasing securities during the existence of an underwriting syndicate, if a member of the syndicate is affiliated with the fund ot its investment adviser. The purpose of this provision is to prevent an affiliated underwriter from selling unmarketable securities to the fund or selling securities to the fund at an inflated price, which were major abuses in the US in the period before the ICA was adopted. The US SEC has adopted a rule that permits purchases from an underwriting syndicate that includes an affiliate, subject to several conditions relating to the nature of the offering and the terms of an investment company's participation. (See Rule 10f-3 under ICA. The US SEC has recently proposed amendments to this rule, designed to make it more flexible. We have enclosed a copy of the proposed amendment). You may wish to consider including a similar provision to prevent an affiliated underwriter from selling unmarketable securities to the fund. [SEC]

* Article 41 prohibits the management company from intentionally encumbering the fund's assets. Article 41 (1.2) should be carefully considered. Collateral is a necessary component of an economy, and the restriction of collateral should be thouroughly reviewed. Perhaps more flexibility can be given to the company without creating risk to the investors. The drafters might consider whether the employees of the management company should be required to be bonded against taking the fund assets through embezzlement, theft, self-dealing, or other crimes and intentional activities. The fund also should be protected from unintentional encumbrances like liens and judments. The investors' money needs to be kept away from the management company's creditors. The translation is unclear but appears to authorize intermingling the company's funds and the investors' funds. Possibly, the provision means the company is authorized to buy and sell assets of the fund. Certainly, intermingling should be prohibited.

Article 41 (1.3) seems to prohibit "short" sales. perhaps it should be made more explicit. Also, this may interfere with the funds ability to "hedge" with certain derivative securities. This is a good area for rules and regulations of the commission, as this area can get very complex. Also, the last sentence of that paragraph is unclear. What does "not affect the relevance of the legal activity" mean? [CEELI]

Ovlastuvawe na dru{tvoto vo pravniot promet

^len 42

(1) Dru{tvoto vo pravniot promet nastapuva vo svoe ime i za smetka na sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel vo otvorenoto dru{tvo i vo ime i za smetka na zatvoreniot fond.

(2) Pravoto na glas od akciite i od drugite prava koi proizleguvaat od imotot na fondot mu pripa|a isklu~ivo na dru{tvoto.

(3) Pobaruvawata po osnov na tro{oci za vr{ewe na raboti za smetka na sopstvenicite na dokumentite za udel vo otvoreniot fond i za smetka na zatvoreniot fond dru{tvoto gi podmiruva od imotot na fondot vo soglasnost so dredbite na statutot na fondot.

(4) Dru{tvoto e ovlasteno i dol`no vo svoe ime da gi ostvaruva pobaruvawata na sopstvenicite na dokumenti za udeli na otvoreniot fond i vo ime na zatvoreniot fond kon depozitnata banka.

Odgovornost na dru{tvoto i fondot

^len 43

(1) Dru{tvoto e odgovorno za vr{eweto na dejnosta na upravuvawe so fondot vo soglasnost so odredbite na ovoj zakon i statutot na fondot. Dru{tvoto odgovara za {tetata pri~ineta na sopstvenicite na dokumenti za udel vo otvoreniot fond za deluvawe sprotivno na odredbite na ovoj zakon i na statutot na fondot. Dru{tvoto so celokupniot svoj imot odgovara za pravnite raboti sklu~eni vo svoe ime i za smetka na sopstvenicite na dokumenti za udel vo otvoreniot fond i za pravnite raboti sklu~eni vo ime i za smetka na zatvoreniot fond.

(2) Fondot odgovara na dru{tvoto samo vo ramkite na ~len 19 stav 3 i ~len 23 na ovoj zakon. Treti lica ne mo`at od imotot na fondot da podmiruvaat svoi pobaruvawa kon dru{tvoto.

U~estvo na pazarot na pari i na berzata na hartii od vrednost

^len 44

Ako u~estvoto na odredeni pazari na pari ili berzi na hartii od vrednost e dozvoleno samo na banki i drugi finansiski institucii, dru{tvata za upravuvawe so fondovi vo taa smisla se izedna~eni so niv.

* Art. 44: Is this provision necessary? Normally, the Company will give a mandate to either the Depo Bank or another broker-dealer to execute trades on the money market/stock exchanges. It is very important, however, that the trades are executed on a "best execution basis" and that the conditions the C get are as favourable as any other institutional investors get. [SFBC]

* Article 44 seems to permit fund participation in certain money markets or stock exchanges even though such activity is otherwise limited to banks or other financial institutions. This is perhaps a language usage problem; what does "equalized with them" mean? [CEELI]

Ograni~uvawe na vlo`uvawata na dru{tvoto

^len 45

(1) Dru{tvoto ne smee nitu direktno nitu indirektno da steknuva dokumenti za udel vo otvoren fond so koj upravuva.

(2) Pri osnovaweto na zatvoren fond dru{tvoto mora da prezeme i da uplati akcii na zatvoreniot fond vo vkupen nominalen iznos od najmalku ..... DEM vo denarska protivvrednost. Po osnovaweto na fondot dru{tvoto ne smee da steknuva novi akcii na zatvoreniot fond.

(3) Dru{tvoto ne smee da gi prodava akciite od stav 2 na ovoj ~len dodeka upravuva so toj zatvoren fond.

* ^len 45-1: [to se smeta direktno, a {to indirektno? (MH)

* Art. 45-1: What if a C manages more than just one Fund? Does this provision then apply to all Funds? [SFBC]

Tro{oci na upravuvaweto so fondot

^len 46

(1) Tro{ocite na upravuvaweto so fondot moraat da bidat utvrdeni vo statutot na fondot. Na tovar na imotot na fondot mo`at da se zasmetuvaat slednite tro{oci:

1. nadomestok za upravuvawe,

2. nadomestok na depozitnata banka i eventualno na drugi lica,

3. tro{oci vo vrska so steknuvaweto i proda`bata na stvari od imotot na fondot,

4. tro{oci na istra`uvawa i objavuvawa,

5. tro{oci na pe~atewe na dokumenti za udel, obrasci za zapi{uvawe akcii i proda`ni prospekti,

6. tro{oci na izdavawe na dokumenti za udel i akcii,

7. tro{oci na isplata na dokumenti za udel,

8. drugi tro{oci na upravuvawe so fondot koi poedine~no se utvrdeni vo statutot na fondot.

(2) Nadomestokot za upravuvawe od stav 1 to~ka 1 na ovoj ~len mo`e da iznesuva godi{no najmnogu do 2% od vkupnata vrednost na imotot na fondot, a tro{ocite na izdavawe od stav 1 t. 6 i 7 na ovoj ~len najmnogu do 5% od vrednosta na udelite i akciite.

* Art. 46-1: Sale prospectus, as well as other marketing expenses should not be an expense undertaken by the fund. As the one who will profit from such sales are portfolio managers, they should undertake directly this expense. [EGRJ]

* Art. 46, 1) Point 8: What expenses could that be? Should be very restrictive in order to avoid abuses! [SFBC]



^len 47

(1) Depozitna banka e bankata {to ja izbira dru{tvoto i koja vrz osnova na dogovorot so dru{tvoto i po negov nalog, gi vr{i site raboti od ~len 48 na ovoj zakon. Izborot na depozitnata banka i sekoja promena podle`i na odobrenie od Komisijata. Dogovorot sklu~en pome|u dru{tvoto i depozitnata banka vleguva vo sila na denot koga }e go odobri Komisijata. Ako se ispolneti uslovite od st. 3 i 4 na ovoj ~len, odobrenie na depozitnata banka mo`e da ne se izdade samo dokolku prethodno e pribaveno mislewe od Narodnata banka na Republika Makedonija koe uka`uva deka izbranata depozitna banka ne e vo sostojba da gi ispolnuva obvrskite, vo soglasnost so ovoj zakon.

(2) Depozitni banki na investicionite fondovi mo`at da bidat banki so sedi{te na teritorijata na Republika Makedonija.

(3) Isto dru{tvo ne mo`e da vr{i raboti na dru{tvo za upravuvawe so fondovi i na depozitna banka.

(4) Dru{tvoto i depozitnata banka pri izvr{uvaweto na svoite obvrski moraat da deluvaat nezavisno i isklu~ivo vo interes na sopstvenicite na udeli i akcii.

* Art. 47-1: What is the procedure in case of a change of Depo bank? Do the unit-owners also have a saying? See IFA 21.

Art. 47-4: Very important provision which, however, needs some specification. Many questions arise, such as: may employees of the Depo Bank also work for the Company? Is it allowed that the Board of Directors of the Company is dominated by representatives of the Depo Bank which could be, for instance, the parent company of the Management Company? [SFBC]

* The drafters may wish to clarify Article 47 (3) by stating that there is no conflict of interest or interlocking directorships between the depo bank and the fund management or the person or persons primarly responsable for the management of the fund's portfolio. The term inappropriate performance in Article 49 (2) is a very loose and ill-defined legal standard to which to hold a bank unless the Macedonian term is defined or commonly understood. Tha bank should be liable for illegal acts, intentional wrongdoing, reckless conduct, gross negligence, and acting or failing to act as required by the contract. [CEELI]

Dol`nosti na depozitnata banka

^len 48

(1) Depozitnata banka, pokraj ~uvaweto na imotot na fondot, gi vr{i slednite raboti:

1. obezbeduva pari~nite sredstva od proda`ba na udeli vo fondot ili akciite na fondot vedna{ da bidat uplateni na posebno otvorena smetka na fondot kaj bankata,

2. izdava dokumenti za udel, gi prima otkupenite dokumenti, vr{i isplata na sopstvenicite na dokumenti za udel i go isplatuva u~estvoto vo dobivkata na fondot,

3. ja utvrduva vrednosta na poedine~niot udel vo fondot,

4. isplatuva dividenda na akcionerite,

5. izvr{uva nalozi na dru{tvoto, ako tie ne se vo sprotivnost so zakon i statutot na fondot,

6. vodi smetka prihodite od imotot na fondot da se koristat vo soglasnost so zakon i statutot na fondot,

7. vr{i i drugi stru~ni raboti koi se odnesuvaat na upravuvaweto so fondot.

(2) Depozitnata banka e ovlastena vo svoe ime da gi ostvaruva pobaruvawata na sopstvenicite na dokumenti za udeli sprema dru{tvoto. Toa ne go isklu~uva pravoto na sopstvenicite na dokumenti na udeli sami da gi ostvaruvaat svoite pobaruvawa.

* Art. 48-1, Point 3: Why can determination of the net asset value of the Fund not be dome by the Company or its delegate?

Art. 48-1, Point 5: I hope that this means that the Depo Bank has the general task of controlling whether the Company complies with the Law and the Statute investment policy? [SFBC]

Art. 48-2: Maybe it should be emphasized that this power will be relevant only in case there are claims for damages affecting all investors, which therefore must be paid into the Fund, whereas individual claims in favour of a specific unit-owner only, must be pursued by the investor himself. The second phrase raises a problem: if the Depo Bank has taken legal steps, the investors should be barred from intervening as well before the courts (danger of conflicting procedures; see IFA 28 subsection 4). [SFBC]

Odgovornost za {teta

^len 49

(1) Depozitnata banka e dol`na rabotite za koi e ovlastena vrz osnova na dogovorot so dru{tvoto da gi vr{i so vnimanie na dobar stopanstvenik.

(2) Depozitnata banka e odgovorna pred dru{tvoto, pred sopstvenicite na dokumenti za udeli vo otvoreniot fond i akcionerite na zatvoreniot fond za {teta nastanata kako rezultat od nevr{ewe ili nepravilno vr{ewe na rabotite utvrdeni vo dogovorot od ~len 47 stav 1 na ovoj zakon.

* As currently defined, Article 49 of the Law provides that the depository could be liable if it implements authorized orders of the manager that conflict with the Law and internal fund rules. requiring the depository to know the Law and the rules of each fund utilizing the depository, and to compare orders transmitted by authorized personnel of each fund with these documents, could provide to be a difficult burden for the depository to meet. An alternative approach would be to permit the depository to rely on the instructions properly given by fund or manager personnel who are specifically authorized in the depository agreement. Under this alternative, the manager, subject to oversight by the fund's board of directors, would be responsible for managing fund assets in accordance with the Law, internal fund rules, and appropriate agreements. Article 49 also might be improved by clarifying that the liability under paragraph (2) results only if it is established that the depo bank failed to act with due care under paragraph (1). [SEC]


Komisija za hartii od vrednost

^len 50

(1) Komisijata vr{i kontrola na raboteweto na investicionite fondovi i dru{tvata za upravuvawe so investicioni fondovi. Vrz raboteweto na Komisijata se primenuvaat odredbite na Zakonot za izdavawe i trguvawe so hartii od vrednost.

(2) Komisijata mo`e bez ograni~uvawe da gi pregleduva delovnite knigi i dokumentite na dru{tvata koi se odnesuvaat na raboteweto na investicionite fondovi.

(3) Komisijata donesuva pravilnik za vr{ewe kontrola na raboteweto na dru{tvata i fondovite.

* Art. 50 & 51: Maybe it should be stated that control over the activity of the Company does not mean that the Commission has powers to interfere with the investment policy of the Fund, provided it is in line with the Law and its Statute (See IFA 56 subsection 3).

I am somewhat concerned that the powers of the Commission are not stipulated detailed enough to give it all the powers it might need. I have the following suggestions/questions:

- What measures can the Commission take in order to protect investors, apart from revoking authorizations? See IFA 58,59 (observer) and 60 (administrative receiver);

- Is the Commission authorized to have special audits undertaken? See IFA 61 (1) and to order investigations against companies possibly violating the Law? See IFA (2);

- Is there an appeal against decisions of the Commission? (IFA 62);

- Is there a clause facilitating cooperation with other government bodies in Macedonia and with supervisors abroad? (See IFA 63).

Maybe the liability provisions should be grouped in one article which should deal with joint liability and limitation of such liability (see IFA 65-67). For the place of jurisdiction, see IFA 68.

* Clearly, the SEC is delineated as the enforcement agency. It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of the enforcement provisions because there are other statutes about the SEC and its authority. These other laws must also apply and could fill gaps in the enforcement scheme. For example, there is no mention here for injunction authority or of due process protection for companies or persons sanctioned with fines or subject to a withdrawal of SEC approval. Perhaps some enforcement provisions are duplicative of those in other laws. It is not clear whether it is intended that a general law on incorporation is also intended to govern the formation of these funds or whether corporate formation laws are supposed to be contained entirely within these draft laws. If the former, there is the potential for overlapping jurisdiction between the governmental agency responsible for corporate formations and the securities regulatory authorities, which is a persistent problem in the US. The provisions relating to the establishment, operation, and authority of the SEC are extremely sketchy. It is assumed that these topics are covered elsewhere. Article 50 (3) might expand the authority of the commission to adopt rules and regulations but also provide for notice, hearings, and so forth to obtain public comment. There should be some appeal to an independent judicial authority of the commission set out in Article 51. Article 51 should be expanded to provide for notice and hearing rights to the participants before the commission can take action against them for "irregularities", in order to permit the participants to offer side of the issue.

Specific clarifications of SEC actions under this particular statute is necessary. Do the management company and the investment fund each have separate SEC approval processes. Article 15 needs to establish criteria to deny establishment of an open-end fund. The draft does not discuss the possible use of "supplemental sale literature", prospective investors at the same time, or after, a prospectus is given to the investor, or about the types of "sales literature", i.e., all other types of marketing communications. Such matters, of course, could be handled by the SEC regulations. Article 52 might also include "bankruptcy" of the company or a reduction in its "net capital" as additional reasons to inform the commission. [CEELI]

Ovlastuvawe na Komisijata

^len 51

(1) Ako pri kontrolata od ~len 50 stav 2 na ovoj zakon Komisijata utvrdi nepravilnosti vo raboteweto ili vo vodeweto na delovnite knigi, }e donese re{enie so koe }e mu nalo`i na dru{tvoto utvrdenite nepravilnosti da gi otstrani vo opredelen rok.

(2) Dru{tvoto e dol`no vo opredeleniot rok od stav 1 na ovoj ~len da gi otstrani nepravilnostite i da ja izvesti Komisijata, so prilo`uvawe na dokazi deka nedostatocite ili nepravilnostite se otstraneti ili ispraveni. Komisijata mo`e na dru{tvoto da mu go odzeme odobrenieto za upravuvawe so fondot ako vo opredeleniot rok dru{tvoto ne gi otstranilo nedostatocite i nepravilnostite.


Obvrska za izvestuvawe

^len 52

(1) Dru{tvoto e dol`no da ja izvestuva Komisijata za:

1. sekoja promena na nazivot ili statutot na dru{tvoto,

2. steknuvawe ili proda`ba na udel na dru{tvoto vo drugo dru{tvo,

3. namerata za osnovawe podru`nica na dru{tvoto vo zemjata ili stranstvo, nejzinoto premestuvawe ili zatvorawe,

4. promena na sedi{teto na dru{tvoto,

5. sekoj akcioner odnosno ~len na dru{tvoto za koj }e doznae deka poseduva pove}e od 10% od akciite, odnosno udelite vo dru{tvoto,

6. sekoja promena na osnovniot kapital na dru{tvoto,

7. odlukata za prestanuvawe na dru{tvoto.

(2) Dru{tvoto e dol`no na Komisijata da i dostavuva godi{ni finansiski izve{tai na dru{tvoto, prospekti na investicionite fondovi so koi upravuva i nivnite izmeni, kako i godi{ni i polugodi{ni izve{tai na tie fondovi.



^len 53

(1) So pari~na kazna od 80 do 250 plati }e se kazni za stopanski prestap dru{tvoto za upravuvawe so fondovi ako:

1. imotot na fondot ne go dr`i i ne go prika`uva odvoena od imotot na dru{tvoto (~len 1 stav 4),

2. zapo~ne da raboti pred dobivaweto odobrenie od Komisijata (~len 15 stav 1).

3. tro{ocite za upravuvawe gi presmeta za smetka na imotot na fondot sprotivno na ~len 23.

4. gi nadmine ograni~uvawata na vlo`uvawata utvrdeni vo ~len 10 .

5. ne gi objavuva podatocite za sekoj investicionen fond so koj upravuva vo soglasnost so ~len 13.

6. osnova otvoren fond sprotivno na ~len 25.

7. dokumentot za u~estvo vo otvoreniot fond ne gi sodr`i podatocite utvrdeni vo ~len 29.

8. vr{i isplata na otkupot na udeli so odbitoci koi ne se izri~no utvrdeni so statutot ili dodeka trae prekinot na otkup na dokumenti za udel izdava novi dokumenti za udel ili ne go prijavi na Komisijata zapiraweto na otkupot na dokumenti za udel i ne go objavi toa vo "Slu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija" i vo eden dneven vesnik (~len 31).

9. raspolaga ili postapuva so imotot na fondot sprotivno na ~len 18.

10. vr{i zapi{uvawe na akcii sprotivno na ~len 41 stav 1.

11. rabotite vo vrska so upravuvaweto so imotot na fondot ne gi prenese na depozitnata banka vo rok od 7 dena od denot na priemot na odlukata so koja Komisijata mu go odzela odobrenieto za upravuvawe so zatvoreniot fond, odnosno od denot na otvoraweto na ste~ajna postapka (~len 46 stav 4).

12. ne ja izvestuva Komisijata vo soglasnost so ~len 52.

13. izdava akcii na zatvoreniot fond sprotivno na ~len 40.

(2) So pari~na kazna od 50 do 250 plati }e se kazni za stopanski prestap depozitnata banka ako:

1. vo rok od tri meseci ne go raspu{ti fondot i ne im go podeli na sopstvenicite negoviot imot ili vo istiot rok go prenese pravoto na upravuvawe so imotot na fondot na nekoe drugo dru{tvo bez odobrenie na Komisijata (~len 33 stav 6 ).

2. ne ja objavi odlukata za raspu{tawe na otvoreniot fond vo soglasnost so ~len 34 stav 1.

3. ne podnese predlog do sudot za otvorawe postapka za likvidacija vo soglasnost so ~len 46 stav 6.

(3) So pari~na kazna od 10 do 30 plati za stopanskite prestapi od stav 1 na ovoj ~len }e se kazni i odgovornoto lice vo dru{tvoto.

(4) So pari~na kazna vo iznos od 5 do 20 plati za stopanskite prestapi od stav 2 na ovoj ~len }e se kazni i odgovornoto lice vo depozitnata banka.

(5) Odgovorno lice vo dru{tvo, odnosno vo depozitna banka ne mo`e da bide lice koe e osudeno za stopanski prestap od st. 1 i 2 na ovoj ~len, za vreme od 3 godini od denot na pravosilnosta na presudata.

* Language in Article 53, such as calling a violation a "tort" and the punishment measured in "salaries", is unfamilliar to American attorneys. It is suggested, however, that consideration be given to expanding the potential consequences to include injunctive action to stop imminent harm, criminal penalties for excessive violations, and, perhaps, civil liability to investors who are harmed by the bad behavior. Article 53 should add liability for compensatory damages to victims. The US has found the public to be the best enforcement when incentives are available. Additionally, the SEC should be able to sanction anyone who makes false or misleading statements in any report or filing with the SEC, if this is not covered in another statute. There are no procedural protections or appeal procedures for persons or companies subjected to fines, withdrawal of approvals, or orders to dissolve under this draft law. Such protections need to be included in one of Macedonia's securities laws. [CEELI]



^len 54

Trgovskite dru{tva koi se zapi{ani vo sudskiot register do denot na vleguvawe vo sila na ovoj zakon, a vo dejnosta ili vo nazivot gi imaat zborovite ili nazivite od ~lenot 16 na ovoj zakon, dol`ni se da gi usoglasat svoite akti so odredbite na ovoj zakon i na Komisijata da i podnesat barawe za izdavawe na odobrenie za prodol`uvawe so rabota najdocna vo rok od 6 meseci od denot na vleguvawe vo sila na ovoj zakon ili vo istiot rok da go prijavat bri{eweto na dejnosta upravuvawe so investicionite fondovi ili promena na nazivot ili negoviot del {to e sprotiven so ~lenot 16 od ovoj zakon i za toa da ja izvestat Komisijata.

^len 55

Ovoj zakon vleguva vo sila osmiot den od denot na objavuvawe vo "Slu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija".


Miscellaneous Drafting Comments

* It might be helpful to add a definitions section at the beginning of the law. Terms such as depo bank, prospectus, securities, and the like are used before being defined, and some terms are never defined. Also, the transaltion is sometimes confusing as to terms. Is a share the management company share or the fund share, the company equity or the fund equity? The draft sometimes uses asset value and net asset value to refer to the same thing, market value of assets minus liabilities, in Article 6 91) and Article 4 (2.11). it would be best to use net asset value consistently for the concept. It is particularly important in the case of Article 10 to know whether net asset value or asset value is the operative term.

Many of the references to other articles of this law are wrong. All references must be checked and corrected, as necessary. Additionally, there are several provisions that seem to belong elsewhere in the draft, especially those that impose requirements on the investment fund management company. For example, Article 1 94) seems misplaced. The article probably should be placed in Chapter V. Article 5 95) may also belong in Chapter V. Article 12 seems to apply only to open-end funds, since determination of net asset value is not very relevant for closed-end funds that trade on share price. Hence, this article may belong in Chapter III. As a related matter, the article should also allow the depo bank to value securities at market price when the securities are traded on another regulated market as provided in Article 9. In general, Article 13 may belong in Chapter V. Article 13 (2), however, may belong in Article 3 or grouped with other provisions in a separate section dealing with application procedures. [CEELI]