University of Newcastle upon
Tyne
Postgraduate Study in Politics
MA in International Studies
A JUST FINIAL SETTLEMENT FOR KOSOVO IS IMPERATIVE FOR THE PEACE AND
STABILITY IN BALKANS
Author, BEKIM ÇOLLAKU
Tutor, Prof. DAVID CAMPBEL
August 2003
C O N T E N T S
A B S T R A C T 3
I N T O R D U C T I O N 4
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CH A P T E R O N E
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1.1. Historical Background 6
1.2. Dissolution of
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CH A P T E R T W O
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2.1. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs: Quest for National Identity 18
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C H A P T E R T H R E E
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3.1. State Sovereignty 37
3.2. International Intervention 39
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C H A P T E R F O U R
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4.1. Self-Determination in Theory and Practice 42
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C H A P T E R F I V E
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5.1. Options for the Final Status of Kosovo 49
5.2. Conditional
5.3. Independent Kosovo 57
5.4. Indefinite Protectorate 59
5.5. Partition 60
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C O N C L U S I O N 64
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B I B L I O G R A P H Y 66
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APPENDICES
- GLOSSARY 73
- MAPS 74
- PICTURES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING AND ATROCITIES 78
- U.N. RESOLUTION 1244 82
- SELECTED RESULTUS OF THE OPINION POLL 89
- INTERVIEWS 92
A B S T R A C T
Kosova /o,
is the disputed region between Kosova's Albanian majority and
From the beginning of the United
Nations Mission in Kosova (UNMIK) and the deployment of a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) peacekeeping force called Kosovo Force (KFOR) in June 1999,
uncertainty over the final status of Kosova has created tension between local
political actors and the representatives of the international community, and
within the international community itself. United Nation (UN) Resolution 1244
committed UNMIK to prepare Kosova for substantial autonomy and self-government
within the
On
There
are thus several reasons for the widespread reluctance to address the status
issue. However, leaving the issue unresolved is itself an inherently unstable
option for
Introduction
Four years have
passed since North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened in Kosovo to
halt a humanitarian catastrophe and restore peace and stability in the Balkans.
NATO air campaign launched on
A great amount
of work has been done so far by scholars to explain the historical background
which brought about the conflict and war in Kosovo. This dissertation will be
another attempt to bring insights into the dispute over the
The first chapter concentrates on revealing historical facts about Kosovo Albanians and their experience of living under Serbian and later Yugoslav rule. It brings a comprehensive account of the ethnic cleansing that Kosovo Albanians experienced for many centuries; the political and constitutional position of Kosovo until the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
Second chapter, focuses on the most sensitive matter which created conflicts not only between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs but also wider in the region. That is the quest for national identity. Differences in origin, language and religion made the conflict between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs genuinely ethnic. However, conflict over Kosovo is not only about ethnic differences, but is about control over territory.
Chapter three explains sovereignty and international intervention in the system of international affairs, but also brings insights relevant to the issue of Kosovo. The forth chapter is a presentation of the concept self-determination in theory and practice. This chapter contains some of the main claims that Kosovo Albanians have towards their right for self-determination.
The fifth chapter is the last and the most important because it makes an attempt to explore some of the most likely options for the final settlement of Kosovo. This chapter contains parts of previous chapters and explores options to the problems revealed earlier. The chapter draws on primary source information taken from interviews. In fact, it is this chapter that contributes most to drawing together a solution to the very difficult and complex issue of Kosovo.
Chapter
I
1.1. Historical Background
International
diplomacy has been considered responsible for partitioning Albanian territories
since the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Further development occurred with the
Ambassadors Conference in
Historical facts reveal a bitter experience of Kosovo
Albanians living under Serbian rule for centuries and argue that the Serbian
policy towards Kosovo Albanians has always been one of ethnic cleansing. The roots
of the ethnic cleansing committed by Serbs against the Albanian ethnic
population are historically based. Lazer Mjeda, the Catholic Achibishop of
Skopje, in a report to
“Among the results obtained is that of progress in towns. Urosevac is no longer the Albanian town it was before, for a large number of Hercegovines have settled there, and they will before long become the dominant element. Pristina is in a good way becoming a modern town and is making a great progress. Pec, where before it was difficult to see one of our people, is today crowded with our colonisers, who seem to give a new life to the town, and very soon they will change the town’s entire character”.[9]
At an
official level the treatment of the Kosovo Albanian question was left at the
hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, and two very powerful
Serb think tanks, the
However,
the most comprehensive program in which the means and methods of solving the
Albanian question were defined was the Memorandum, “The Expulsion of
Albanians”, presented by the leading Serb historian Vasa
Cubrilovic.[11]
Although the memorandum was presented at the Serbian Cultural Club on
“At a time when
According
to the very detailed project, the only way to provide a final solution to the
Albanian question was to expel Kosovo Albanians, en masse, collectively
in
During World
War II (1941-1945), chetnik’s according to the
project of Stevan Molevic, “Homogenous
The same
genocide policy applied to Kosovo Albanians after World War II. To implement
the intentions for segregation and discrimination,
Not until the open war broke out in Kosovo (1998) was the civilized world able to witness the horrible genocide crimes Kosovo Albanians had gone through. According to a report released by the U.S. Department of State, within less than a year Serb military, paramilitary and police forces had forcibly expelled over 1 million Kosovo Albanians from their homes. In this process of ethnic cleansing, Serbian forces had conducted mass executions, separated military - aged men from their families, raped women and girls, destroyed mosques and churches, and looted and burned homes and villages.[17]
1.2. The Disintegration of
On
The crisis
began with the failure of the 1966 economic reforms and continued with the 1967
constitutional crisis, which led to the promulgation of the 1974 Constitution.[25]
Under this, Republics became "nation-states" whose relations were
based on the principle of consensus amongst the eight constitutive parts of the
federation. Until the very end, the concept of nationality, unclear in the Yugoslav constitutional system,
remained in contrast to the concept of people. Unofficially, peoples were understood to be ethnic formations whose ethnic
centers lay within the boundaries of
Tito's death in 1980 increased troubles in Kosovo, the population of which was predominantly Albanian. The Albanian uprising in 1981 demanding the status of a Republic was suppressed militarily. According to some estimates, more than 1,000 Albanians were killed, over 2,000 arrested, and officially it was reported that 479 had been sentenced.[27]
The collapse of
the Yugoslav economy perpetrated a form of ultra-nationalism in
The conflict
had an additional geo-political factor. The European Community (EC) also played
an important part in the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY) primarily because of the interests of
In 1991, the parliaments of
In the case of
The "Greater Serbia"[36]
plan revived by Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences and ready to be executed
by the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, brought about the overt
distribution of arms to Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. The
settlement of Serbs in ravaged and militarily occupied territories, and the
formation of local governments such as "Serbian Krajina",
as well as the preparations for referendums on the annexation of liberated
territories to Serbian Yugoslavia occurred.[37]
Such practices were part of the larger plan of " all Serbs, one
country" which explains their role in the subsequent events. To fulfill
this goal, Milosevic managed to put under his control the Yugoslav People’s
Army (YPA) which in 1991 was renamed as the Yugoslav Army.[38]
Serbian struggles to take over Croatian territories resulted in open war
and the outcome was terrible. Although
One could foresee, from the beginning, that the process of the
dissolution of
Like the governments of
The
shooting at a Serbian wedding in Sarajevo on 1st March 1992-when the
revellers, some waving Serbian flags, were fired on by gunmen killing the
groom’s father, marked the beginning of the bloodiest war in Yugoslavia.[44]
After only a few weeks of fighting, the number of refugees fleeing the Serbian
onslaught grew at an astonishing rate. By the autumn of 1992 the Bosnian war
had produced two million refugees. This highlights the deliberate strategy
employed by Serbian and Croatian forces to create ethnically monolithic in
The
Practice of ethnic cleansing, it should be noted, has been employed by all
three sides in the conflict in Bosnia, however, many groups and observers
including Helsinki Watch, Amnesty International, the US Sate Department, and
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), share the belief that Serbia has been
the initiator and principal perpetrator of ethnic cleansing.[46]
Along with ethnic cleansing, the perpetrators of ethnic exclusivism
used a variety of other terror tactics to impose their will on members of other
ethnic groups. Rape as a part of ethnic cleansing and as a crime against
humanity was exercised; women of all ages were raped.[47]
Prison camps were established for captured members of military units and for
civilians; inmates were starved, beaten, or killed giving Western television
audiences’ images of emaciated prisoners not seen from
For almost a century, Kosovo Albanians were left in the mercy of Serbian regime, all they experienced was fear, terror, prosecution, humiliation, violence, expulsion from their homes and being killed in front of their families. However, the saying ‘The Yugoslav crisis began in Kosovo and it will end in Kosovo’ appeared to be true[49]
On
Chapter II
2.1. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs: The Quest for
National Identity
In the contemporary world, inter-ethnic relations have taken on a
special significance and are very often a greater priority than socio-economic
processes itself. Furthermore, on many occasions in the second half of the
second century, disputes and conflicts in interethnic relations have placed
states or entire regions into bloody wars bringing death and suffering for
thousand of people. An example in the
As the ideological contest between capitalism and communism abates
with the break up of the
Before addressing interethnic relations that brought about the dissolution of FRY, it useful to explain briefly the concepts and definitions related to ethnicity, national identity, nation and state.
Ethnicity – seems to be a new term", state Nathan
Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, who point to the fact that the term's earliest
dictionary appearance is in the Oxford English Dictionary of 1953. Its meaning is equally uncertain. It can mean ‘the
essence of an ethnic group’ or ‘the quality of belonging to an ethnic community
or group’, or ‘what it is you have if you are an “ethnic group”.[55]
The word is derived from the Greek ethnos (which in turn derived from
the word ethnikos), which originally meant
heathen or pagan. It was used in this sense in English from the mid-14th
century until the mid-19th century, when it gradually began to refer to
"racial" characteristics. In the
‘Ethnic identity’ and ‘ethnic origin’ refer to the individual level of identification with a culturally defined collectivity, the sense on the part that she or he belongs to particular cultural community. Schermerhorn’s definition on ‘ethnic community’ states that:
An ethnic group is defined as a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their people hood. Examples of such symbolic elements are: kinship patterns, physical contiguity, religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features or any combination of these. A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group[58].
For the purpose of the study, I draw on key ideas of four views on ethnicity and ethnic conflict to make an attempt to explain the rise of xenophobic nationalism and ethnic violence among people who had lived together cooperatively for about forty years. There are four views on ethnicity and ethnic violence that are common. First, in the ‘primordial’ view ethnic attachments and identities are a cultural given and a natural affinity, like kinship sentiments. Applied to the former Yugoslavia, the primordialist Kaplan (1993) believes that despite seemingly cooperative relation between nationalities in Yugoslavia, mistrust, enmity, even hatred were just below surface, as had long been true in the Balkans.[59]
It is important
to mention that ever
since its founding after World War I, and throughout several changes in both
its name and social structure,
Triggered by
fierce competition for political power during the breakup of
In stark
contrast to ‘primordialist’, the second,
‘instrumentalist’ view treat ethnicity as a social, political and cultural
resource for different interest and status groups. Brass (1991) and Cohen’s
(1974) view is that it ‘ focuses on elite competition for resources and
suggests that manipulation of symbols is vital for gaining support of the
masses and achieving political goals’.[62]
Rosens (1989) suggests that ethnic sentiments and
loyalties are manipulated by political leaders and intellectuals for political
ends, such as state creation. For
The third ‘constructionist’
view of ethnicity and ethnic conflict was originally formulated by Kuper (1977). It supplements the insights of the primordial
and of the instrumentalist views. Religion or ethnicities are very real social
facts, but in ordinary times they are only one of several roles and identities
that matter. In the words of
Fourth model of ethnic
violence (Posen 1993; Gagnon 1997) centers on state breakdown, anarchy, and the
security dilemma that such conditions pose to ethnic groups who engage in
defensive arming to protect their lives and property against ethnic rivals,
which then stimulates arming by other ethnic groups like an arms race between
states. The driving motivations are not ethnic hatreds but fear and insecurity.[67]
In the Yugoslav crisis Michael Ignatieff puts it
thus:
Once the Yugoslav communist state began to split into its constituent
national particles the key question soon became: will the local Croat policeman
protect me if I am a Serb? Will I keep my job in the soap factory if my new
boss is a Serb or a Muslim? The answer to this question was no, because no
state remained to enforce the old ethnic bargain [68]
Ethnic nationalism according
to Lukic and Lynch is ‘essentially incompatible with
the idea of a federation’. For that reason they argue, ‘federal structures
erected on the basis of ethnic nationalism, as were both the
In what
follows, I focus on the creation of national identity and offer an account of the
re-emergence of nationalism in modern conditions of modernity with regard to
the rise of nationalism in the break up of
Politics for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state[73]
On the other hand, the difficulty of defining a nation
springs from the fact that nations comprise a mixture of objective and
subjective features, a blend of cultural and political characteristics.[74]
In objective terms, nations are cultural entities: groups of people who
speak the same language, have the same religion, are bound by a shared past.
Such factors undoubtedly shape the politics of nationalism, for instance, the
nationalism of the Quebecois in
Nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which – it came into being.[77]
Anderson argues that print-languages laid the basis for national consciousness in three ways: they created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars; they gave a new fixity to language, helping to build an image of antiquity, central to the subjective idea of the nation; and they created languages of power which differed from older administrative vernaculars.[78] National consciousness is derived from sharing values, traditions, and memories of the past and plans for the future contained within a particular culture, which is thought and spoken in a particular language.[79] For Schleiermacher, ‘only one language is a particular mode of thought and what is cogitated in one language cane never be repeated in the same way in another…’[80] From this definition it can be easily noted that language is a powerful instrument that not only can distinguish one nation from another, but also may be regarded as a medium of division and separation, though in very few cases it may, even, bridge any kind of religious difference.[81]
In the case of Kosovo, ethnic difference seems to have
been more profound and perpetual; whereas in Croatia and Bosnia all groups
share practically the same language, distinguishing themselves primarily
through religion, Serbs and Albanians do not only belong to different faiths,
they also speak two completely different tongues. This has made the conflict, a
conflict between Slavs and non-Slavs, more genuinely ‘ethnic’.[82]
The Serbs are people who speak a Slavic language related to other Slavic
languages such as Russian, Polish, Czech, and Bulgarian. The Serbs have lived
in the Balkans since about the 7th century AD. They moved in from the north and
east of
Three religions, Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism, have long co-existed
in Kosovo. A large majority of Kosovo Albanians consider themselves, at least
nominally, Muslim. A minority of about
60,000 are Catholic. Most Kosovo Serbs, even those who are not active believers,
consider Orthodoxy an important component of their national identity. Nevertheless, despite this essential division
of religious activities along ethnic lines, it cannot be said that religion per
se was an important contributing factor to the conflict between Serbs and
Albanians. Kosovo Albanians do not define their national identity through
religion, but through language. They have a relatively relaxed approach towards
the observance of the Islamic religion.
Neither Islamic leaders nor Islamic theology played a significant role
in either the eight-year campaign of non-violent resistance to the Serb
occupation regime, or the armed resistance of 1998-99. Islamic political and social fundamentalism,
as that term is understood with respect to the
Nationalism, as both ideology and a social movement, has
been one of the formative processes of the modern world. In relations between
established states nationalism is invoked as a basis for territorial disputes,
war, or for economic advantage. In contrast to earlier periods when the
emphasis in domestic and international politics was on convergence and universalization, even the creation of a single world
community, there is now much more stress on the importance of what
distinguishes people – tradition,
identity, authenticity, the politics of difference.[86]
The process of globalisation, by creating a world market and flow of goods,
technology, and people between states, also provokes responses and resistance
by those who feel their interests are threatened. Therefore, nationalism can be
seen as a reaction against globalisation but in another sense, it is also
a product of globalisation. The upsurge in nationalism of the 1980s and
1990s reflects the failure of other forms of state building, above all in the
former multi-ethnic countries of the communist world. After the collapse of
Soviet communism in 1991 four states disintegrated along national lines – the
For Ernest Gellner, nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment, whereas, a nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind.[89]
Hobsbawn defines nationalism as a political programme and in historic terms
a fairly recent one. It holds that groups defined as ‘nations’ have the right
to, and therefore to, form territorial states of the kind that have become
standard since the French Revolution.[90]
Lederer argues that throughout the centuries
nationalism has altered his flow, as have war, revolution, social-economic
transformations, and ideologies.
However, nationalism has been the fact of life for nearly two hundred
years.[91]
For the purpose of my dissertation, I will concentrate
more on trying to elaborate the Serbian and Albanian nationalism. The cradle of
Serbian nationalism is historical myth that goes back to the royal house of Nemanjici and their medieval state, which flourished in the
twelfth and thirteen centuries on the territory of present
The Battle of Kosovo and the claim that the seat of the
Serbian Orthodox Church was first established in Kosovo, are the two essential
myths feeding Serbian nationalism for centuries. These myths were manipulated
and used to bring to power the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, who is being
held responsible for breaking up the former
The abantiquo argument,
which has to do with the historical past of Kosovo is used extensively by foreign
analysts to point out the importance of Kosovo for the Serb nation. It is often
repeated that Kosovo is the central myth of Serb national consciousness, the
cradle of their medieval state and their church, and just for these reasons it
is being argued that it is impossible to allow Kosovo to become independent
from
Further on Rama
argues tha besides the surprising fact that the international
community is suddenly concerned with the historical inheritance of nations,
what appears to be even more intriguing is that the international community
does not give the same weight to the arguments that Kosovo was the cradle of
the medieval Albanian state and the cradle of the contemporary Albanian state.
The medieval state of Balshaj, “the Rulers of
Albania,” and many other Albanian principalities extended here from the
mid-fourteenth century to the late fifteenth century. The Battle of Kosovo that
feeds the Serb myth of victimization was not just the battle of Serbs “to save
the Christendom” as we often hear. The Battle of Kosovo was fought by a Balkan
coalition. Albanian feudals were heavily involved in
the Battle of Kosovo and one of the triumvirs that led the Balkan Army
coalition with the Serb Prince Lazar Grebljanovic,
and King Tvarko of
Rama thinks that the Serb past in Kosovo could be very well
compared to the relationship between the
On the other hand, the debate concerning the origin of
the Albanians is still unresolved, though no one questions the fact that they
are the oldest inhabitants in the
Since the war ended and conflicts in the regions
stopped, great efforts have been undertaken by the international community to
reconcile these two people. Achievements are evident, but nationalism is rising
again, making difficult reconciliation and achieving a final settlement for Kosovo.
Recently, the highest representatives of
Kosovo for Serbs means the same as
This is clearly a blind nationalist approach and
paradox. In no form of Christianity, including Eastern Orthodoxy, does a ‘holy
place’ play any sort of theological role equivalent to the role of
Remains to be seen whether the international community
will react against these recent actions undertaken by Serbian government, which
represent direct threat for peace in Balkan region.
Chapter Three
3.1. State Sovereignty
Sovereignty is a central political concept. A political body is sovereign in so far as it alone has the authority to be the ultimate decision maker, to have, we might say, the last word’.[110] Lyons and Mastanduno argue that the concept of sovereignty has been continually evolving since first developed as an instrument for the assertion of royal authority over feudal princes and, then went through historic transition by the settlement of Westphalia in 1648-creation of independent states, each enjoying sovereignty over a given territory.[111] In order to possess sovereignty, a regime must possess (1) territory, (2) population, (3) it must be able to maintain a modicum of order within its territory and among its people, and finally (4) the regime must be recognized as sovereign by states already possessing sovereignty. Under the Westphalian formula, sovereign states have three absolute prerogatives: independence (a state completely free to organize any system of government), equality (every state is of equal rank with every other state), unanimity (a state is bound only if it agrees to be bound).[112]
Friedrich Kratochwil suggests an analogy between sovereignty and property, both in their origins and in their evolution as social constructs. He claims that ‘ownership is not absolute but is subject to limits on its use and disposition, limits that over time change in accordance with the overarching values of the society in which we live’. Thus, there are limits on sovereignty in the responsibilities that sovereign states owe to those whom they rule.[113]
The dramatic fragmentation and
dismemberment of major states such as the
The ability of authoritarian states to strip citizens of their rights to security of life, often shrouded under a thin veneer of non-interference in internal affairs of the state, is increasingly challenged on a global scale. Repressive and predatory regimes and other human rights violators are increasingly being exposed and made accountable for their actions.[116] The United Nations Charter Article 2 (7) and the OAU Charter Article 3 (2) respectively stipulate that they will not intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. However, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the power to determine what constitutes a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and act of aggression; and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken…to maintain or restore international peace and security".[117]
Nowadays, the concept of sovereignty is becoming understood more in terms of conferring responsibilities on government to assist and protect all persons residing in their territories, so much so that if governments fail to meet their obligations, they risk international scrutiny, admonition, and possibly condemnation and reprisals.
3.2. International Intervention
Four cases occurred at a time when there
were heightened expectations for effective collective action following the end
of the Cold War. All four of them -
Humanitarian intervention is an act, which seeks to intervene to stop a government murdering its own people.[119]
David Little observes that the recent
policy of NATO of using force to protect Albanians in Kosovo against massacre,
ethnic cleansing, and other forms of gross and systematic human rights abuse by
Serbian military forces raised deep legal and moral questions in regard to a
general doctrine of force and humanitarian intervention. On such a complex
subject, he suggests focus on three major problems attending the use of force
in Kosovo: its authorization, effects and conduct. The NATO bombing campaign
was undertaken without specific authorization by the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC). Thus NATO on this occasion ignored the very body that is
invested by the U.N. Charter with final responsibility for certifying a use of force
among states, because two member states,
The effectiveness of NATO military policy in Kosovo remains highly controversial. There are allegations that the NATO campaign made matters worse, both for ethnic Albanians and for the Serbs living in Kosovo. However, the policy of massive ethnic cleansing was terminated, refugees returned back and the prospects for justice and peace have improved.[124] The legitimacy of a humanitarian intervention depends not only on what happens during and immediately after the intervention, but also on the longer-term follow-up. Those who undertake humanitarian intervention have obligations to ensure that their actions contribute to a stable and productive outcome.[125] Therefore, one could make a final evaluation on the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo only after finding a long lasting solution acceptable for all sides involved in the conflict. If peace and stability will prevail in Balkans after NATO intervention, if people will not kill each other just because of different ethnic belonging, if multi-ethnicity will prevail over mono-ethnicity, then we can say that intervention in Kosovo was justifiable.
Chapter Four
4.1 Self-Determination in Theory and Practice
The doctrine of national self-determination, recently, has been
regarded of pressing importance; as since 1991 numerous multinational states
have disintegrated along national lines. Between 1947 and 1991 only one
instance of secession had taken place-
The history of self-determination is bound up with the history of the doctrine of popular sovereignty proclaimed by French revolution:
Government should be based on the will of the people, not on that of the monarch, and people not content with the government of the country to which they belong should be able to secede and organise themselves as they wish.[127]
A thorough analysis of the evolution and present status of
self-determination leaves no doubt that it is today, and indeed has been for a
long time, a core principle and fundamental right in international law. The
principle of self-determination is prominently embodied in Article I of the
Charter of the United Nations.[128]
Earlier it was explicitly embraced by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and others,
and became the guiding principle for the reconstruction of
We believe these fundamental things: first that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live…[129]
The principle was incorporated into the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which evolved into the United Nations Charter. Its inclusion in the UN Charter marks the universal recognition of the principle as fundamental to the maintenance of friendly relations and peace among states. It is recognised as a right of all peoples in the first article common to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which both entered into force in 1976. Paragraph 1 of this Article provides:
All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. [130]
It is the attempts to deny the right to self-determination that have contributed to the break up of Yugoslavia, that have inflamed and embittered this process, and that have caused the bloody tragedies and ethnic cleansing that have taken place. It is a common feature of criticism about the workability of the right of peoples to self-determination to stress the lack of a competent organ in the international community to determine which people are entitled to such right.[131]
The international legal instruments on self-determination refer to the right of self-determination as belonging to “all peoples.” In determining who are title holders to the right of self-determination the plain meaning of the language should be taken as the starting point. It is a well-established maxim of international law, contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and affirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), that terms in international legal instruments ordinarily are to be interpreted according to their plain meaning.[132]
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) International Meeting of Experts for the Elucidation of the Concepts of Rights of Peoples developed a more detailed description in 1989, specifically for the purpose of identifying the holders of the right to self-determination. This description (sometimes referred to by participants as the “Kirby definition” after its principal drafter, Justice Michael Kirby), identifies a people as:
a group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all of the following common features:
(a) a common historical tradition;
(b) racial or ethnic identity;
(c) cultural homogeneity
(d) linguistic unity;
(e) religious or ideological affinity;
(f) territorial connection;
(g) common economic life.[133]
As indigenous people, Kosovo Albanians believe they possess all above mention features that constitute people’s right for the self-determination. The exercise of self-determination requires, by its very nature, the expression of the will of the people. This was granted to the Kosovo people signing the Rambouillet Agreement. Article 3 of the amendment contained in Chapter 8 read:
Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional measures.[134]
What follows, is an examination of some of the basis for self-determination relevant to the case of Kosovo. There are those who argue that a group attains a moral right to self-determination/secession when it has suffered certain kinds of threats or grievances, including historical ones, such as previous invasion or annexation, as well as threats to its cultural preservation, threats of genocide, and finally ‘discriminatory redistribution’.[135] While doing my research and taking into account different cases where right for self-determination has been applied, in no case other than Kosovo have I found all these moral arguments that best justify the right of Kosovor people for self-determination.[136]
On the other hand, self-determination can be regarded as a basic
right, rooted in the liberal democratic theory, available to any group the
majority of whose members desire it. Here, self-determining groups have to be
at least as liberal and as democratic as the state from which they are
separating, to demonstrate a majority preference for self-determination, to
protect minority rights, and to meet distributive justice requirements.[137]
Related to Kosovo and its people, it is true that the majority of people living
in Kosovo (Kosovo Albanias) have demonstrated their
will through the referendum in which they decided for separation from
Analysts argue that the case of Kosovo is not just another case of
secession of an unruly region but the case of Constituent Federal Unit of the
Yugoslav Federation with well-defined borders, which enjoyed a high degree of
sovereignty. With the dissolution of
With the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, the last legal
vestige that kept Kosovo tied to
The continuity of FRY was preserved regardless of the dissolution
process until February 4, 2003 when two chambers of the Yugoslav parliament
marked the demise of the troubled Balkan federation and the birth of a new
country called “Serbia and Montenegro”, as outlined in a deal brokered by the
EU.[143] Meanwhile, Kosovo
governed by UNMIK still waits for its final status. One could wonder why
despite all the arguments listed so far in this dissertation, Kosovo’s fate
remains still uncertain.
Chapter Five
5.1. Options for the Final Status of Kosovo
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 1999 envisaged the withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces of FRY, whereas enabled a synchronised deployment in Kosovo of an international civil and security presence under UN auspices, albeit under separate command UNMIK and NATO –led KFOR. Resolution 1244 also envisaged the appointment of a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) to administer Kosovo.[144]
Resolution 1244 did not foresee any definitive political solution
for Kosovo, nor did it determine its future status. For the interim period of
the international administration, Resolution 1244 reaffirmed the commitment of
UN member states both to sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY on that
time and to the substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration of Kosovo,
while also mandating UNMIK to facilitate a political process designed to
determine Kosovo’s future status.[145]
It is very important to mention that Resolution 1244 was neither the product of
an agreement between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs containing a road map on how to
implement a political settlement of Kosovo conflict, nor an agreement between
exhausted opponents seeking a compromise and an end to their conflict.[146]
Much has changed in Kosovo and in the region since the NATO bombardment of FRY
(spring 1999) and subsequent arrival of UNMIK and KFOR. One of the first
challenges to the international presence in Kosovo after June 1999 was the
demilitarisation of Ushtria Çlirimtare
e Kosoves (UÇK) as foreseen in Resolution 1244. On
The international community has invested much effort and money to
prepare Kosovo for a substantial autonomy. So far, under auspices of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) two rounds of local
elections and last year general elections for central institutions have been
held. The first free local elections ever held in Kosovo and internationally
recognized, marked the beginning of a new era for citizens of Kosovo - that of
democracy and freedom. As a result of these elections, Kosovo today has its
local governments established in all municipalities, as well as the central
government which was created on the basis of a political agreement signed by
three major Albanian political parties- Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves
(LDK)-(Democratic League of Kosovo), Partia Demokratike e Kosoves
(PDK)-(Democratic Party of Kosovo) and Aleanca per Ardhemerine e Kosoves
(AAK)-(Alliance for the Future of Kosovo).[149]
The good thing about the election was the participation of all minorities
living in Kosovo including the Serb minority, who had 10 seats reserved to the
Assembly of Kosovo even before the election took place. Overall, the Serbian
minority holds 22 seats of the 120 seats in the assembly.[150]
International community together with Kosovor
institutions have made a great effort to build trust and confidence among all
communities living in Kosovo and to ensure the return process of all those
refugees who want to come back. Special attention has been delivered to the Serbian
community who has been more reluctant to accept the new reality in Kosovo.
Engaging this community in all structures of Kosovar society has often been difficult
because authorities in
The integration of Serbs and other minorities into Kosovar society,
including their full participation in the political process, is one of the
essential benchmarks set by UNMIK in achieving democratic standards and
building a democratic life in Kosovo. The institutions of Kosovo and their
leaders are aware of the importance of this and have spent much time, have
undertaken many efforts towards this end. The letter of the main Kosovor leaders addressed to displaced persons in
If you acknowledge Kosovo for as homeland, then it is time to come back home. Only together we can make Kosovo a place for all of us to be proud.[152]
Despite all efforts made so far with regard to this matter and a few positive trends marked recently, the situation on the ground remains tense. Reasons and factors are various, but the fact that UN Resolution 1244 envisaged the return of an agreed number of Serbian personnel to Kosovo is the one that creates illusions among people. The UN Resolution 1244, Annex 2, under point 6 read:
After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav
and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following
functions:
·
Liaison
with the international civil mission and the international security presence;
·
Marking/clearing
minefields;
·
Maintaining
a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
·
Maintaining
a presence at key border crossings.[153]
The Serb minority in Kosovo still thinks that
The question over final status remains open and according to the
international community this matter cannot be solved neither in Prishtina nor
What follows now is an attempt to explore some of the options for the final status of Kosovo, which have so far been advocated by a few international outstanding institutes and organizations. Besides this, the views of some of the main local leaders on this issue, as well as the attitude of majority of the people living in Kosovo will be presented.
5.2. Conditional
Conditional independence is both a goal and a process. The goal is sovereignty and independence for the people of Kosovo, within limits prescribed by the international community - that is, provided Kosovo respects the territorial integrity of its neighbours, maintains internal peace and respect for human rights, and provides protection for the traditions and institutions of the minority community. Conditional independence does not preclude (indeed, it probably requires) developing close relations with Kosovo's neighbours, especially those in whatever entity is developed to replace the FRY. But these new relations are best developed on a voluntary basis from the starting condition of sovereign independence, and it is up to the people of Kosovo, in free negotiations with their neighbours, to decide what these should be. Conditional independence is also a process of progressive devolution, under which powers currently held by the international community, through the SRSG, are progressively transferred to locally elected officials. The goal of conditional independence is not to keep political responsibility in the hands of the international community, but to devolve it back where it belongs, to the people of Kosovo.[161] Conditional independence is the only solution that meets all the key criteria for ensuring internal and regional stability simultaneously. With its assurance of independence from the FRY, it would enjoy legitimacy with the majority Albanian population. Economic development and foreign investment, currently hampered by the lack of a resolution of status, could proceed. With the removal of doubts – and the accompanying hopes and fears – over future status, it could be hoped that, despite the warnings of Kosovo Serb leaders, the chances for Albanians and Serbs to normalize their relations would be greater, improving the environment for return and minority rights.[162]
There are
three main arguments that are put forward against this proposal. The first
concerns democracy in
5.2. Independent
Kosovo - is
another option that has been explored and strongly argued by the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).[165] CSIS report published in April 2003 Achieving
A Final Status Settlement for Kosovo presents a rationale and roadmap for a
final status agreement leading to a fully sovereign and independent Kosovo.
After analyzing all the relevant factors, of all the options the report
suggests that only independence offers the prospect of a promising future for Kosovo
and its neighbors. The case for independence can be elaborated on the basis of
political, economic, and regional security considerations.
Political
- A freely elected self-government will gain
greater legitimacy as a sovereign organ rather than as a simple tool in
the hands of international players, primarily the United Nations. Its
authority and accountability to the electorate will be enhanced through
the successful completion of the process leading to statehood. This will
also undercut attempts to subvert or circumvent the legitimate Kosovor authorities by nondemocratic
and organized criminal elements favoring a weak or uncertain state that
allows for their illicit operations, not only in Kosovo, but also across
the border in
- An international commitment to statehood
would lessen the likelihood of a social explosion in Kosovo provoked by
painful economic conditions. Public morale and discipline will also
increase with the realization that independence, which is overwhelmingly
favored by the majority of the population in Kosovo, is achievable,
imminent, durable, and vital to preserve.
- The creation of an independent Kosovor government, parliament, and judicial and other
institutions is the only way to develop a law-abiding society and an
inclusive democracy in which all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, are
granted the full array of human and civil rights, including the right to
return of all legitimate Serb refugees to their homes. Most importantly,
an independent government will be in a position to set social, economic,
and institutional priorities and draft legislation—actions now almost
entirely in the hands of UNMIK and other international organizations.
Economic
- There is little prospect for economic
development until Kosovo is independent and self-governing, as any other
status solution would lead to growing instability. Only responsible and
empowered public institutions in an independent Kosovo will set the
political priorities and invest in the infrastructure and services that
will reduce the costs of production for private entrepreneurs and spur
economic growth. Moreover, few, if any, foreign investors are likely to
venture into a territory whose status remains unclear and whose future is
ambiguous.
Regional Security
- Only statehood for Kosovo would ensure a
more durable regional security in the Balkans—one that is not based
principally on the presence of outside forces. With the development of an
internal police force and a credible Kosovor
military contingent, threats can be diminished and deterred, and contributions
can be made to the international struggle against organized terrorism and
criminality.
- The Stabilization and Association Process
(SAP), the EU’s main program for encouraging reform in the Balkans,
requires participants to be, at a minimum, functioning sovereign states.
As other Balkan states make progress towards the eventual goals of
European integration, Kosovo is unable to participate because of its
status as international protectorate. Only an independent Kosovo, not
represented by UNMIK, can begin the essential process of European
integration.
- Maintaining the de facto integrity of Kosovo
will send a strong signal to extremists and ethnic agitators in
Finally, fears have been raised that independence for Kosovo will lead
to further disintegration in the region. It has been asserted, for example,
that independence for Kosovo would open the door for the Republika
Sprska (RS) to secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
open the door for other ethnic groups within
5.3. Indefinite Protectorate – rely upon the argument of Kosovo’s unready ness for final status and the full autonomous self-government, let alone independence. Therefore, it is often argued, much more time is required to build functioning, democratic institutions before final status should be considered. The unsatisfactory security situation for minorities and the lack of adequate conditions for the return of refugees are further reasons why a continued international presence is required. It will be some time before local institutions can be entrusted with internal security and the protection of the rights of minorities. The unstable situation in neighbouring Macedonia and southern Serbia, the fragility of Serbia’s post-Milosevic transition, fears of heightened pro-secessionism in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska are all cited as further reasons for putting off discussion on Kosovo’s final status.[169] While analysing this option, The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) highlights following criteria:
- Regional stability: problems exist, but the risks so far have proven manageable
so long as KFOR is in place. Requires KFOR vigilance in southern
- Legitimacy: Serbs will want UN role; Albanian extremists may resist violently if final status is delayed indefinitely, UNMIK maintains authority, or European Union becomes the protector.
- Viability: International community prepared to stay, with the possible
exception of the
- Democratization/Refugees: Current slow progress in the right direction might be halted if Albanians see indefinite postponement of final status decision.
- International missions: International military presence would have to be open-ended.[170]
This is the
option implied by the new constitutional framework. Such an option is
unacceptable for all the reasons given above. While it might allay uncertainty
if independence were clearly ruled out, the tension between the international
administration and Kosovor demands for
self-determination could easily reach breaking point.[171]
5.4. Partition – is the idea that Kosovo might be partitioned into Serb and
Albanian entities. Nationalist groups in
Other options for the final status of
Kosovo have been explored too, but the seem less realistic to occur. Therefore,
I will not comment on them. What follows now is a summary of the main points
expressed by key Kosovor leaders on the issue of
final status. The Prime Minister of Kosva, Mr Bajram Rexhepi
in an exclusive interview conducted for the purpose of this dissertation stated
that:
Full independence and sovereignty of
Kosovo under recognized administrative borders is the corner stone of a solution,
however we must be prepared other possible alternatives, for example, Monitored
Independence for 2-3 years, to make sure that the minority rights,
democratisation, the rule of law are completely met. More or less, a kind of
Conditional Independence would be acceptable. Other options such as: Partition,
Confederation, Federation etc are completely ruled out as unacceptable.[176]
The President of Kosovo, Mr Ibrahim Rugova known as a
leader of peaceful movement during 1989- 1996 has a slightly different view. According
to him, Kosovo is de facto independent and there is a need only for
formal recognition. On one occasion he said:
For more than a decade Kosovo continues to ask for independence and the creation
of this identity. I insist that a formal recognition of Kosovo’s independence
would calm the region of the
On the other
hand, the former political leader of UÇK and present President of PDK, Mr Hashim Thaçi
has been considered as very pragmatic and realistic regarding the final status
of Kosovo. In an interview conducted by myself, he reaffirmed his view to have
a moratorium on this matter for certain period of time. He argued that ‘during
this phase of misunderstandings considering the political status, Kosovo and
Kosovo is part of
In the end, I bring views expressed by the President of AAK, Mr. Ramush Haradinaj. His personal stand which the stand of his party too, is that ‘the Independence of Kosovo is nonnegotiable’. Further more, he emphasized:
The final status of Kosovo can be solved through the implementation of the Kosovo people’s will for an Independent Kosovo. We should negotiate only to harmonise implications that might come out during the implementation of the final status.[179]
Conclusion
Drawing a conclusion on a complex issue such as Kosovo is
very difficult and almost impossible. Complexity arises from the mere
historical facts related with Kosovo, but also with the issue of Albanian populate
living throughout the region. Of a total of over eight million Albanians on the
planet, half live in
Taking into account the experience of ethnic cleansing and
the consequences of terrible war that Kosovo Albanians went though, it will be
absolutely naïve and unjust to ask from them accept the Serbia rule again.
Further more, all observations, analysis and opinions expressed so far by
Albanian leaders, but also from ordinary people lead to one conclusion. Kosovo
Albanians will not accept anything less than independence. On the other side,
The issue of Kosovo’s status will not be solved independently from
the establishment of the new international order in the southeastern
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY
AAK
COMFOR Commander
of Kosovo Force
CSIS Center
for Strategic and International Studies
EU European
Union
FRY
RYROM
IC International
Community
ICG International
Crisis Group
ICJ International
Court of Justice
KFOR Kosovo
Force
KLA Kosovo
Liberation Army
KPC Kosovo
Protection Corps
KPS Kosovo
Police Service
LDK Democratic
League of Kosovo,
NATO
OSCE Organization for
Security and Cooperation in
PDK Democratic
Party of Kosovo
QPK Qeveria e Perkoshme e Kosoves, (Provisional Government of Kosovo)
RS Republica Serpska
SAP Stabilization
and Association Process
SRSG Special
Representative of the [UN] Secretary-General
TMK Trupat Mbrojtese te Kosoves
UNESCO United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UÇK Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosoves
UN United
Nations
UNMIK
United
Nations
UNSCR United
Nations Security Council Resolution
US United
States
APPENDIX B
MAPS
Balkans, Ethnic Majorities, (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/balkans.jpg,
(http://www.albanian.com,
Former Yugoslavia - Ethnic
Majorities from Former Yugoslavia: A Map Folio, 1992, (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/yugoslav.jpg,
Kosovo (Political), (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/kosovo_pol98.jpg,
13, May 2003)
APPENDIX C
PICTURES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING AND ATROCITIES
The Kosovo Catastrophe
Ethnic Albanian refugees -- among tens of thousands fleeing as a
result of "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo -- peer from a truck as they
arrive in
Children waiting to enter
Photo: Damir Sagolj/REUTERS
Albanian American Civic League (http://aacl.com/62.html,
A mother and her sixth month son were killed in
the massacre of Obri, Skenderaj,
(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/cleansing/,
APPENDIX D
U.N. RESOLUTION 1244
Resolution 1244 (1999)
Adopted by the
Security Council at its 4011th meeting,
on 10 June
1999
The Security Council,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling its resolutions 1160
(1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
- Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;
- Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
- Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
- Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;
- Decides on
the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international
civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as
required, and welcomes the agreement of the
- Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;
- Authorizes
- Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;
- Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:
- Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;
- Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;
- Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;
- Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;
- Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
- Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;
- Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
- Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations;
- Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;
- Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:
- Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
- Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;
- Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;
- Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;
- Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
- In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;
- Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;
- Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
- Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;
- Protecting and promoting human rights;
- Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;
- Emphasizes
the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the
- Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;
- Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;
- Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;
- Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;
- Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;
- Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;
- Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;
- Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;
- Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex 1
Statement by the
Chairman
on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers
held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:
- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.
Annex 2
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:
- An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
- Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;
- Marking/clearing minefields;
- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
- A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.
- Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.(1) A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:
Withdrawal
- Procedures
for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation
of a buffer area in
Returning personnel
- Equipment associated with returning personnel;
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
- Timetable for their return;
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.
Notes
- Other required elements:
- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;
- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);
- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals;
- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.
Source: United Nations
APPENDIX E
SELECTED RESULTUS OF THE
OPINION POLL
From official census data of the
|
Year |
Total number |
|
|
Ethnic composition (%) |
|
||
|
|
|
Albanian |
Serb |
Montenegrin |
Turkish |
Muslim |
Other |
|
1913 |
497,456 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1921 |
439,010 |
65.8 |
26.0 |
|
6.4 |
|
|
|
1931 |
552,064 |
60.0 |
32.6 |
|
|
|
7.4 |
|
1948 |
733,034 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1953 |
815,908 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1961 |
963,988 |
67.2 |
23.6 |
3.9 |
2.7 |
0.8 |
1.2 |
|
1971 |
1,243,393 |
73.7 |
18.4 |
2.5 |
1.0 |
2.1 |
2.0 |
|
1981 |
1,588,400 |
77.5 |
13.2 |
1.7 |
0.8 |
3.7 |
4.1 |
|
1991* |
2,000,000 |
90.0 |
8.0 |
|
|
|
2.0 |
* the data for 1991 is estimated, the census of that year was boycotted by the Albanian population.
Sources: Musa Limani, The Geographic Position, Natural Riches,
Demographic Characteristics, and the Economical Development of Kosovo
(Prishtina, Kosovo: The Association of Lawyers of Kosovo,
1992); Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
Index Kosovo,
joint venture with BBSS Gallup International, conducted a public opinion poll in
May 2002, where several questions were posed to Kosovor
citizens about the most important things in life and trust in different
institutions. The survey was concluded from 17th-23rd May throughout Kosovo
with 1,000 Albanian citizens aged 18 years plus.
The research was conducted with the stratified multi-staged method, a random
method that ensures a representative coverage of Albanian citizens of Kosovo.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 :: to have a job |
6 :: to have a happy family |
|
|
2 :: to get an education |
7 :: to live in freedom |
|
|
3 :: to be faithful to my religion |
8 :: to live in a country without |
|
|
4 :: to have a good standard of living |
|
violence and corruption |
|
5 :: to live in a country with no war |
9 :: to have a good health |
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Index Kosovo, (http://www.indexKosovo.com/, 10August 2003).
|
Table
1.1. Macroeconomic indicators (values are given in million Euros) Indicators 2001 2002 20002/20002 GDP 1,747 1,990 113,9 % Per capita GDP 941 1,051 111,7 % Consumption 2,550 2,742 107,5 % Family consumption 1,722 1,934 112,3 % Imports 659,8 432,1* - Exports 10,6 14,2* - GNP 2,434 2,648 108,8 Source:
MEF, Macroeconomic Unit, Early Warning System, Kosovo, Report #2 September-December 2002 * Values for imports and exports are given for the period January-June 2002 |
|
Table 1.2. Perception of respondents
on current economic trends in Kosovo (in percentage) Albanians Serbs Others Total* Not satisfied at all 17.8 27.8 14.1 18.2 Not satisfied 38.3 38.1 34.2 38.0 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 25.1 26.3 28.3 25.4 Satisfied 15.2 3.6 18.5 14.7 Very satisfied 0.7 0.0 2.2 0.7 DK/NA 2.9 4.1 2.7 3.0 Total 100 100 100 100 Source: Opinion poll, November 2002, Early
Warning System, Kosovo, Report #2 September-December 2002 The data has been weighted based on the percentage of community participation in the overall population of Kosovo (88% Albanians, 6% Serbs and 6% other communities), according to the 1991 census |
|
Table 1.3. The living standard of
families in 2002 Perception of living standard Percentage Poor 19.0 Below average 30.9 Average 47.0 Above average 2.7 Wealthy 0.4 Total 100 Source: Riinvest,
Survey of 1,252 families, December 2002
|
APPENDIX F
INTERVIEWS
Three very important interviews expressing views of the three major political leaders of Kosovo have been conducting for the purpose of this dissertation. Following are the key political interviewed:
Dr. Bajram Rexhepi
Prime Minister of Kosovo
Mr. Hashim Thaçi
President of the Democratic Party of Kosovo
Mr. Ramush Haradinaj
President of the
Full transcript of these interviews can be obtained only upon request made in the following e-mail address: bcollaku@hotmail.com